What Drives Recessions and Expansions? - Accounting for Business Cycles in an Era of Crises. by João Ricardo Mendes Gonçalves Costa Filho
WHAT DRIVES RECESSIONS AND
EXPANSIONS?
Accounting for business cycles in an era of crises
Joa˜o Ricardo M. G. Costa Filho
Doctoral Thesis in Economics
Supervised by
Pedro Brinca
Joa˜o Correia-da-Silva
January, 2018
Success is not final, failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue that counts.
Winston Churchill
i
Biographical Note
“It is not personal, but I hate mathematics”. This quote is from a conversation I
had with my undergraduate professor of quantitative methods, Gustavo Mirapalheta
(before he advised me during the undergraduate thesis, using quantitative methods).
Boy, I was wrong! I concluded my undergraduate studies in Business Administration
in 2008, from ESPM in Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil – the city I was born in January 13, 1986.
At the time, I also joined the ESPM’s swimming team (and became director of
swimming at the students athletic organization). As you can see by the content of
this thesis, I changed a lot during that time. The emphasis in finance in the latter
years of my undergraduate studies revealed that my future interests were not aligned
with marketing (the reason I chose ESPM in the first place) anymore. I wanted to
become an economist!
Talking to Frederico Turolla (former professor, current partner/friend) about
choosing to change the course of my career, I learned that in Brazil we have two
types of masters degree: academic and professional. This information would be
precious on the near future. I applied (and was approved) to the MSc in Economics
at University of Kent. Over there I aimed to study...game theory! (Not bad for
someone who – wrongly – coined the first phrase of this note a couple years before).
The greatest financial crisis since the 1930s plus the lack of financial possibilities
made impossible for me to study at Kent. I was frustrated, but perhaps this went
for the better. I found that the Sa˜o Paulo School of Economics at Getu´lio Vargas
Foundation (EESP-FGV) had a new research line in Financial Macroeconomics.
At EESP-FGV I learned a lot. And while I was gathering the knowledge to
accomplish my new goal (to become an economist at an important bank) I found
passion in a different and very, very unexpected path: teaching. Suddenly, I wanted
to become a professor of economics, not a professional economist anymore. Then I
realized I should do a PhD. I “anticipated” the defense of my master thesis in six
months (because I wrote it before finishing the other credits) and applied to the
program at FEP.
Charles Bukowski once wrote “I want the whole world or nothing”. That is how
I felt when I left my country and crossed the Atlantic. And from a certain point of
view, that’s exactly what I got (the former, not the latter). But, instead of stealing
it like the bucolic writer, I “conquered” it, by allowing an amazing feeling to grow.
Suddenly, I was a citizen of the world. But the conquest was just getting started.
Doing a PhD is a hard task. Doing it “an ocean” away from your home is even
harder. In one way or another, I managed it. I arrive in Porto on September 3,
2011. The first short exam was on September 6. The second on September 7 (and
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this continued like that for two weeks). Difference and differential equations. The
game had just got started!
I felt in love with the country, with the city, with the people, with the food! I
made great friends at FEP. And also at Hapkido classes (a Korean martial art that
I sadly haven’t continued to practice after my years in Porto).
At the end of the master in economics and the beginning (to the middle) of
the PhD I started a blog about (international) macroeconomics, entitled Economic
Approach. I actually received a job offer to become an economist in a consultancy
firm in Porto because of it. I declined because it was in the first semester of the
PhD course and I knew I could not handle to do both (I did it during the master in
economics, but working and studying at this level is not an easy task, trust me).
In 2013 I had to go back to Brazil and ended my blog.
At home I invested in starting my academic career. I became a Teaching As-
sistant at the same master program in Economics I attended to. Then the worst
period of my life happened. Let me just say that a negative exogenous shock hit
my life and things become very, very complicated. And this exogenous shock arouse
from whom I would never expected. The bright side is that it helped to craft some
great friendships for life. For instance, when I became an associate consultant at
Pezco Economics and Business Intelligence, whose senior partner/owner is Frederico
Turolla.
Unexpectedly, an invitation came to teach Statistics at the EESP-FGV Profes-
sional Master in Economics. I became a professor of economics in the very program
I learned economics for real and I was thrilled. And a little bit terrified. Almost at
the same time, I became also professor of Economics at Armando Alvarez Pentado
Foundation (FAAP). Within a few semesters, I was teaching subjects I really like,
such as International Finance, Financial Macroeconomics and Statistics (at EESP)
and Introduction to Economics, Brazilian Economy and Game Theory – destiny has
its own whims – at FAAP. This is just to name a few.
Other teaching opportunities appeared (also at different institutions) and semester
after semester I struggled with myself to decrease a little bit my around-25-hours-
per-week teaching load. Add to this the more than 70 op-eds I wrote since 2013 (in
Brazilian and international publications) and the difficulties I experienced during a
complicated period (2013-2014) and you understand why I took too long to finish
the PhD (we do not have the counter-factual, but I think it is safe to affirm that
it would be different – and faster – if I could only dedicate my time to the thesis).
But to be honest, I have no complaints. Life has been pretty amazing for me.
I think this is it, in a nutshell. Oh, and also another passion have emerged in
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the past four years: the “samba de gafieira” (a sort of ball room samba).
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Abstract
This thesis addresses business cycles modeling along a few dimensions. In Chap-
ter 2, a comprehensive literature review on Business Cycles Accounting, a tool to
understand the drivers of business cycles fluctuations and to help in the modeling
process, enables a threefold contribution. First, to present an explanation of the
method to the non-specialist researcher, along with its extensions (monetary, open-
economy and international business cycle accounting) and the “mappings” from
detailed economies to prototype models. Second, to analyze the drivers of the 1973,
1990 and 2001 recessions in US (fulfilling the gap in the existing Business Cycles
Accounting literature. Third, to draw broad conclusions regarding the relative con-
tribution of each wedge in explaining macroeconomic data movements.
International crises are usually transmitted via either price or quantity shocks on
the balance of payments. But what if the integration of intermediate goods markets
changes no only how output is produced, but also how crises are transmitted? Using
the weak recovery of Mexico during the Great Recession (slower than the one after
the “Tequila crisis”), Chapter 3 applies the Business Cycles Accounting and provides
two contributions. First, within the “accounting” dimension, the main driver of
the Mexican Great Recession is the efficiency wedge. Second, an equivalence is
proposed between the neoclassical growth model (both in the closed and open-
economy versions) and a small open-economy model augmented with intermediate
imported goods in the production function. The model is able to reproduce both
the intensity and the velocity of the recoveries from the 1995 and 2008 crises after
exchange rate shocks. The results reveal an international transmission mechanism
“hidden” in the efficiency wedge.
In Chapter 4 the economic depression Brazil experienced within 2014-2016 is
addressed. The synthetic control estimations point towards a domestic source of the
crisis, whereas the business cycle accounting method finds that it was driven by the
efficiency wedge. The econometric evidence reveals that the development bank out-
lays have a positive (negative) impact in the short (long) run in the efficiency wedge.
A general equilibrium model with financial frictions and a public development bank
is able to reproduce the dynamics of output during the crisis.
Keywords: Business Cycle Accounting, Brazil, Mexico, United States, Reces-
sions, Expansions, Business Cycle Modelling, DSGE, Open Economy, Financial Fric-
tions
JEL Classification: E30, E32, E37, E50, E51, E60, E65 F41
vii
Resumo
Esta tese aborda a modelagem de ciclos econoˆmicos em algumas dimenso˜es. No
Cap´ıtulo 2, a revisa˜o abrangente da literatura sobre Business Cycles Accounting,
uma ferramenta para entender as flutuac¸o˜es dos ciclos de nego´cio e para ajudar no
processo de modelagem, permite uma contribuic¸a˜o tripla. Primeiro, apresentar o
me´todo ao pesquisador na˜o especialista, ale´m das suas extenso˜es (moneta´ria, em
economia aberta e dos fluxos internacionais) e os “mapeamentos” de economias
detalhadas para proto´tipo de modelos. Depois, analisa a as recesso˜es de 1973, 1990
e 2001 nos EUA (preenchendo a lacuna existente na literatura de Business Cycles
Accounting). Terceiro, apresenta concluso˜es amplas sobre a contribuica¸˜o relativa de
cada distorc¸a˜o aos movimentos de dados macroeconoˆmicos.
As crises internacionais geralmente sa˜o transmitidas atrave´s de choques de prec¸o
ou quantidade na balanc¸a de pagamentos. Mas e se a integrac¸a˜o dos mercados de
bens intermedia´rios mudar na˜o so´ a forma como o produto e´ produzido, mas tambe´m
como as crises sa˜o transmitidas? Usando a fraca recuperac¸a˜o do Me´xico durante
a Grande Recessa˜o, o Captulo 3 aplica o Business Cycles Accounting e conclui
que o principal motor da Grande Recessa˜o mexicana e´ a distorc¸a˜o de eficieˆncia.
Depois, apresenta equivaleˆncias entre o modelo de crescimento neocla´ssico (tanto
nas verso˜es de economia aberta como fechada) e um pequeno modelo de economia
aberta com bens intermedia´rios importados na func¸a˜o de produc¸a˜o O modelo e´
capaz de reproduzir a intensidade e a velocidade das recuperac¸eso˜ das crises de 1995
e 2008 apo´s choques cambiais. Os resultados revelam um mecanismo de transmissa˜o
internacional “escondido” na distorc¸a˜o de eficieˆncia.
No Captulo 4, a depressa˜o econoˆmica que o Brasil experimentou no perodo 2014-
2016 e´ abordada. As estimativas de controle sinte´tico apontam para uma fonte
dome´stica da crise, enquanto que o Business Cycles Accounting indica que o episo´dio
foi resultado do comportamento da distorc¸a˜o de eficieˆncia. A evideˆncia econome´trica
revela que os desembolsos do banco de desenvolvimento pu´blico teˆm um impacto
inicial positivo na distorc¸a˜o de eficieˆncia, mas depois de alguns trimestres afeta
negativamente a mesma, mais do que compensando o efeito inicial. Um modelo de
equil´ıbrio geral com fricc¸o˜es financeiras e um banco de desenvolvimento pu´blico e´
capaz de reproduzir a dinaˆmica de produc¸a˜o durante a crise.
Palavras-chave: Contabilidade de Ciclos de Nego´cio, Brasil, Me´xico, Estados
Unidos, Recesso˜es, Expanso˜es, Modelagem de Ciclos de Nego´cio, DSGE, Economia
Aberta, Fricc¸o˜es Financeiras
Classificac¸a˜o JEL: E30, E32, E37, E50, E51, E60, E65 F41
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What drives recessions and expansions? This question motivated a whole research
agenda may be answered with two words that seem to be real friends of researchers
in economics: it depends. Which recession? Which expansion? After the rational
expectations revolution in the 1970s we do not have an unique framework for an-
swering that question. Each episode seems to be driven by different reasons. In
the 1980s the Real Business Cycles (RBC) models lead the way to DSGE model-
ing. When the perfectly competitive framework was not enough, imperfections were
introduced. The New Keynesian models became the mainstream DSGE modeling
practices and the set of theoretical models keep expanding.
The rise of DSGE modeling called for proper guidance. Which is the best model
to explain a particular episode? One way is to use theory to narrow the search and
test the candidates. This procedure alone seems to be inefficient and Business Cycle
Accounting (henceforth BCA) emerged to complement the theory-driven search,
fulfilling the gap of proper guidance.
This thesis was written under the two presented pillars (DSGE modeling and
BCA) and it aims to contribute to business cycles analysis literature in three di-
mensions: a survey on BCA literature (the broad-conclusion-on-existing-literature
dimensions), the identification of an transmission channel of international crises (the
equivalence dimension) and the analysis of a particular episode (the Brazilian 2014-
2016 depression), which represents the “accounting dimension”. In order to do that,
this thesis is composed by three essays, besides this introduction.
Chapter 2, entitled “Business Cycle Accounting: from theorems to findings” has
a comprehensive analysis of BCA literature findings. It presents an explanation of
the method to the non-specialist researcher, along with its extensions (monetary,
open-economy and international BCA). Also, it applies BCA to three US recessions:
1973, 1990 and 2001 (fulfilling the gap in the existing BCA literature). The re-
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sults show the efficiency wedge as the main driver, whereas the wedge playing the
secondary role changed according the episode.
BCA also relies on mappings from detailed economies to prototype models with
wedges. Therefore, the chapter surveys the already known mappings and by combin-
ing them with the literature findings, not only we can draw some broader conclusions
on the relative importance of the wedges, but also by gathering, synthesizing and
systematizing enough results, it provides a useful starting point for future research.
Among the main results of the chapter is the fact that the efficiency wedge seems
to be the lead driver of business cycles in general, whereas for some episodes such
as the Great Recession in US, the labor wedge has the most important role. The
investment wedge may help to explain country risk spreads in international bonds,
while the government consumption wedge appears to have a less important role,
even during international crises.
International crises are typically perceived as either price or quantity shocks on
the balance of payments. But what if the integration of goods markets changes
how output is produced and also how crises are transmitted? Chapter 3, entitled
“Output falls and the international transmission of crises”, uses the weak recovery of
Mexico during the Great Recession (slower than after the “Tequila crisis”), applies
BCA and provides two contributions.
First, within the “accounting” dimension of BCA, the main driver of the Mex-
ican Great Recession is the distortion in the production decision (the efficiency
wedge). Second, an equivalence is proposed between the neoclassical growth model
and a small open-economy model augmented with intermediate imported goods in
the production function. The model is able to reproduce both the intensity and
the velocity of the recoveries from the 1995 and 2008 crises after exchange rate
shocks. The results reveal an international transmission mechanism “hidden” in the
efficiency wedge.
In Chapter 4, “Economic depression in Brazil: the 2014-2016 fall”, the essay
tackles the fact that, during the Great Recession, Brazil experienced a fast recovery.
However, since then, it seems to have lost the ability to grow. Moreover, the country
entered in a depression for eleven quarters, registering two years of contraction in
GDP for the first time in history. The synthetic control estimations point towards
a domestic source of the crisis, whereas the BCA indicates that it has been driven
by an efficiency wedge.
What is behind the protagonism of the efficiency wedge during the Brazilian
depression? Due to the rapid public credit growth, the hypothesis that the de-
velopment bank and the efficiency wedge were associated was investigated. The
2
estimation reveals that while an increase in the outlays has a positive impact on the
wedge in the short run, after a few quarters the effect is negative and offsets the pre-
vious positive contribution. Furthermore, a general equilibrium model with credit
market frictions and a public development bank is able to reproduce the dynamics
of output during the crisis.
Finally, Chapter 5 present the main conclusions of the three essays, along with
some proposals for future research based on this work.
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Chapter 2
Business Cycle Accounting: from
theorems to findings
All people know the same truth. Our lives consist of how we choose to distort it.
Woody Allen (bold is mine).1
2.1 Introduction
Business cycles fluctuations have been analyzed under several different approaches.
From the theoretical modeling side, the first generation of Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium models (DSGE) was the Real Business Cycle theory, where fluctu-
ations are driven by technology shocks and nominal variables have no effect on the
real side of the economy. Sometimes, however, the models needed some changes to
fit data. Why? One hypothesis is that “data is wrong”. It is possible that mismea-
surement of aggregate data leads researchers to wrong conclusions. However, it also
possible that in order to have a better representativeness of real world DSGE models
need to be extended to encompass, for instance, nominal price rigidity, frictions in
the labor markets and financial frictions.
But what is the best friction to be introduced? Does it change throughout time,
or across countries? The importance of DSGE modeling in understanding business
cycles called for some guidance to help researchers in developing their models. The
Business Cycle Accounting (henceforth BCA) method intends to fulfill this need.
Resembling growth accounting, data is confronted with a prototype economy. In the
model we have four main macroeconomic decisions: production, the intratemporal
choice between labor and leisure, the intertemporal choice between consumption and
savings and how to satisfy the resource constraint. Each decision is distorted by a
1Woody Allen as Harry Block in the movie Deconstructing Harry.
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wedge (the four wedges are: the efficiency wedge, the labor wedge, the investment
wedge and the government consumption wedge, respectively).
By construction, the four wedges together account for the whole data. After
estimating the four wedges, a decomposition is done to assess which wedge(s) is(are)
more important. In order to do that, the path of the variables of interest (e.g.
output) is simulated allowing one wedge to vary at a time, holding the remaining
wedges constant. The comparison of simulations with different wedges helps us
identify the relative importance of each distortion. This is the first contribution of
BCA: the accounting dimension.
After understanding the drivers of short-run movements, the next contribution
of BCA is related to the equivalences. The prototype economy can be mapped into
different detailed economies, given the wedge that is introduced. For instance, an
efficiency wedge may arise from input-financing frictions (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997;
Mendoza, 2010), a labor wedge from nominal rigidity and monetary policy shocks
(Bordo et al., 2000), a investment wedge from credit markets with agency costs
(Carlstrom & Fuerst, 1997) and a government consumption wedge from constraint
on foreign borrowing (Chari et al., 2005).
The literature then evolved to approach other dimensions, extending the basic
framework: monetary BCA, open-economy BCA and international BCA. The rea-
soning remains the same: the outcomes of a benchmark model with distortions are
compared with data, though the prototype economies are different. The first in-
corporates price rigidity and deals with deviations from monetary policy rules and
inflation. In the second, the set up for the prototype model is a small open economy.
Finally, the third one analyses the economic relationship between economies, in a
two-country framework. All extensions introduce new wedges and maintain the four
original wedges (with possible changes).
The contribution of this paper is threefold: the first is to present the method (its
extensions and limitations) to the non-specialist. The second is to fulfill the BCA
literature by applying it to three US recessions: 1973, 1990 and 2001. Moreover,
there is a discussion on the relative importance of each wedge during expansions
and recessions. The third is to survey the vast literature on BCA and gather it
in a systematic way. The variety of countries (developed and emerging markets)
and episodes (e.g. the Great Depression, currency crises and the Great Recession)
provide a rich sample to assess whether there is a pattern on the relative importance
of each wedge.
The results from BCA for the US in the three episodes provide different roles
for each wedge. The efficiency wedge is the most important, accounting for at least
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50% of output movements. However, the secondary role changes from one episode
to another. For instance, for the 1973 and 1990 recessions it is the labor wedge,
whereas for the 2001 it is the government consumption wedge, an unusual result
(see ).
Even though the relative importance of each wedge changes from one episode
to another, it is safe to affirm that the efficiency wedge has an important role in
output fluctuations either by explaining output movements and/or the aggregate
investment dynamics. The labor wedge, on the other hand, is closely related to hours
of work. Investment wedges, in an open-economy set up, may help to explain country
risk spreads on international bonds. Moreover, larger changes in interest rates and
currency crises are usually associated with investment and/or the labor wedges (the
former usually for emerging markets whereas the latter may be important for both
developed and emerging economies). The government consumption usually is not
as important as the other wedges. Its capability of explaining economic fluctuations
is very often either very small or nil.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces BCA, pre-
senting the prototype economy and how to implement the procedure (applying it
to US data) and its limitations. In Section 2.3 the mappings from different classes
of detailed models into the prototype economy with wedges are addressed. Section
2.4 presents the extensions of the method: monetary business BCA, open-economy
BCA and international BCA. Section 2.5 discusses the literature findings for the ap-
plications of business cycle accounting and its extensions for developed and emerging
market economies. Finally, in Section 2.6 some conclusions are drawn.
2.2 Business Cycle Accounting
Real Business Cycle (RBC) modeling of macroeconomic fluctuations was pioneered
by Kydland & Prescott (1982). Though it is an important contribution to economics,
sometimes the neoclassical model needed to be modified for a better fit to data2.
Then, when building quantitative models, researchers should make choices, some-
times departing from the perfectly-competitive-markets model in order to reproduce
key features of data. But what are the best choices to make?
BCA is one method to help researchers. In the same spirit as growth accounting,
in which economic growth is decomposed into accumulation of production factors
and a residual, BCA analyzes the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations as a func-
2For instance, Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992) identify the need to modify RBC models to
account for the correlation between hours of work and productivity.
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tion of change in factors and four residuals3.
The starting point is the so-called neoclassical growth model4. An extensive body
of research has devoted its efforts in creating models departing from the neoclassical
framework. For instance, some models introduce nominal price rigidity, wage rigidity
and labor unions5. But which distortion is better? Does the answer change from
one episode to another? The BCA literature helps to respond these questions, and
shed some light on how to proceed further.
BCA was introduced by Chari et al. (2002) and consolidated in Chari et al.
(2007a) (henceforth CKM)6. In an economy composed by firms and consumers,
agents behave rationally and choose how to allocate resources in each period t,
given the state of the economy and the history of events. There is a probability
associated with each possible state, and the initial state is taken as given. Four
exogenous variables are introduced in the neoclassical growth model (all of them
functions of the state of the economy). By doing this, equilibrium conditions of
the neoclassical growth model are distorted. Each distortion is per se variable over
time. There are four distortions (wedges): the efficiency wedge, the labor wedge,
the investment wedge and the government consumption wedge. They are named
after the four equilibrium conditions they distort.
The efficiency wedge is related to production factors utilization. It is represented
by a (residual that looks like a) technology parameter in the production function.
The labor wedge creates a departure from the optimum condition relating labor
decisions. It is important to note that distortions to labor supply (consumers) and
labor demand (firms) are measured together and cannot be separately identified.
The labor wedge manifests itself in the form of a time-varying tax on marginal
product of labor.
The investment wedge is related to the intertemporal choice between present and
future consumption (the combination of consumer’s and firm’s Euler equation). It
also appears in the form of a time-varying tax on investment, distorting intertempo-
ral allocation of resources across of the world. Finally, the government consumption
wedge changes the economy’s resource constraint and manifests itself in the form of
government expenditure. In the case of an open-economy, it also encompasses net
exports.
3The growth accounting literature was pioneered by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957).
4The neoclassical growth model goes back to the works of Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and
Koopmans (1965), in which savings decisions are endogenous, rather than exogenous as in Solow
(1957), for instance.
5Mankiw (1990) presents an overview of how literature evolved by encompassing different fea-
tures in macroeconomic modeling.
6In Chari et al. (2002) there were only three wedges (efficiency, labor and investment).
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2.2.1 The Prototype Economy
At any time t the probability of a given state of nature st is denoted by pit(s
t) where
st = (s0, ..., st) is the history of events up to and including period t. The initial
state s0 is given. Consumers maximize expected lifetime utility over per capita
consumption (ct) and labor (lt) for each t and s
t
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
pit(s
t)βtU(ct(s
t), lt(s
t))Nt,
subject to the budget constraint for all t and st:
ct(s
t) + (1 + τxt(s
t))xt(s
t) = (1− τlt(st))wt(st)lt(st) + rt(st)kt(st) + Tt(st)
Following Brinca et al. (2016), adjustment costs (φ( xt(s
t)
kt(st−1))) are added to the
the law for capital (kt) accumulation:
(1 + γ)kt+1(s
t) = (1− δ)kt(st−1) + xt(st)− φ( xt(s
t)
kt(st−1)
),
where (1 − τl,t) is the labor wedge, 1/(1 + τx,t) is the investment wedge, β is the
discount factor, U(.) stands for the utility function, Nt is the population (which
has a growth rate of γN), xt is per capita investment,wt is the real wage rate,
rt is the return on capital, δ is the depreciation rate, Tt is per capita lump-sum
transfers from the government to households, γ is the technological growth rate and
φ( xt(s
t)
kt(st−1)) =
a
2
( xt(s
t)
kt(st−1) − b)2, with b = δ+γ+γN , representing the steady-state value
of the investment-capital ratio. At the same time, firms gather capital and labor in
perfectly competitive markets to maximize profits Πt, given the production function
yt(s
t) = F (kt(s
t−1), (1+γ)tlt(st)), which is distorted by the efficiency wedge (At(st)):
max
kt,lt
Πt(s
t) = yt(s
t)− rt(st)kt(st−1)− wt(st)lt(st).
Combining the optimal decisions of both consumers and firms, the production
technology and the resource constraint, the four equilibrium conditions of the model
are obtained:
yt(s
t) = At(s
t)F (kt(s
t−1), (1 + γ)tlt(st)), (2.1)
−Ul,t(s
t)
Uc,t(st)
= (1− τl,t(st))At(st)(1 + γ)Fl,t, (2.2)
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Uc,t(s
t)(1 + τx,t(s
t)) =
β
∑
st+1
pit(s
t+1|st)[Uc,t+1(st+1)(At+1(st+1)Fk,t + (1− δ)(1 + τx,t+1(st+1)) + φkt+1 ],
(2.3)
ct(s
t) + xt(s
t) + gt(s
t) = yt(s
t), (2.4)
where Uc,t, Ul,t, Fl,t, Fk,t and φkt+1 are derivatives of the utility function, the pro-
duction function and adjustment costs with respect to its arguments and gt is the
government consumption wedge. The four equations above are used in the BCA
exercises.
Finally, the government defines taxes and transfers in a way that satistfies its
budget constraint,
Gt(s
t) + Tt(s
t) = τx,t(s
t)xt(s
t)Nt + τl,t(s
t)wt(s
t)lt(s
t)Nt,
where G is the government spending.
2.2.2 Applying Business Cycle Accounting
After solving the model to get the equilibrium conditions (equations 1-4), it is useful
to rewrite them so we can express the wedges. The efficiency wedge is given by
At(s
t) =
yt(s
t)
F (kt(st−1), (1 + γ)tlt(st))
, (2.5)
whereas the labor wedge is defined as
(1− τl,t(st)) = −Ul,t(s
t)
Uct(st)
(At(s
t)(1 + γ)Fl,t)
−1, (2.6)
the investment wedge is defined by
1
(1 + τx,t(st))
=
Uc,t(s
t)(β
∑
st+1
pit(s
t+1|st)[Uc,t+1(st+1)(At+1(st+1)Fkt + (1− δ)(1 + τx,t+1st+1) + φkt+1 ])−1,
(2.7)
and finally we have the government consumption wedge
gt(s
t) = yt(s
t)− ct(st)− xt(st). (2.8)
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In order to compute optimal decisions, we must assume some functional forms.
Following Chari et al. (2007a), the production function has a Cobb-Douglas form,
F (k, l) = kαl1−α, the utility function is U(c, l) = ln c+ψ ln(1−l), the share of capital
in the production function α = 0.35, the time allocation parameter ψ = 2.24, the
depreciation rate of net capital stock δ = 0.0118, so that the annualized depreciation
is 5%, and the discount factor β = 0.993, implying that the rate of time preference
is 2.8%. Moreover, γ = 0.004 and γN = 0.0039 are calculated from data and the
parameter in the adjustment costs funcition, a = 12.574, from Brinca et al. (2016).
Let us call yDt , l
D
t , x
D
t and g
D
t the data for output, hours of work, investment and
government consumption, respectively. Let us equate actual data and the values
prescribed by the model. From equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.8) we can compute
directly the values of the wedges. However, in equation (2.7) there is an expectation
term, calling for some assumptions regarding the stochastic process for pit(s
t).
Let us assume that pit(st|sτ−1) = pit(st|st−1), i.e. the probability of state st given
the history of events sτ−1 is equal to the probability of state st given the state
st−1, therefore, it follows a first order Markov process. Moreover, we also assume
that ii) agents rely only on previous realization of wedges to forecast future wedges
and iii) the wedges are sufficient statistics for the event at t. Furthermore, the
mapping from the event st to the wedges is assumed to be one to one. Therefore,
st = (At, (1− τl,t(st)), 1/(1 + τxt(st)), gt) follows a vector autoregressive process7:
st+1 = P0 + Pst + t+1, (2.9)
where P0 is the vector of constants, P is the matrix of coefficients and t+1 is the i.i.d.
shock with zero mean and covariance matrix V , which is positive semidefinite by
construction. This implies that there are spillovers from wedges through the matrix
of coefficients P and the correlations of innovations in V . Usually, the Kalman filter
is used to get the maximum likelihood estimator for the coefficients 8. Therefore,
we can have a one-period ahead prediction, which is necessary for the evolution of
the system9.
Using real data on output (yDt ), hours of work (l
D
t ), investment (x
D
t ), private
(cDt ) and government (g
D
t ) consumption, we can equate the outcome of the model
with observed data for each variable e.g. for output we equate yt(st, kt) = y
D
t and
7Ba¨urle & Burren (2011) presents necessary and sufficient conditions for assuming that wedges
follow a VAR process. Sˇustek (2011) finds that for the US, a first order VAR process is enough.
8Brinca et al. (2017) analyze whether BCA and its monetary extension - see Section 2.4 - suffer
from identification failures. They conclude that if estimation is restricted to latent variables, there
is no problem. The same is not true for deep parameters.
9See Chari et al. (2006) for further technical details.
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write the following system of equations:
yt(st, kt) = y
D
t , lt(st, kt) = l
D
t ,
xt(st, kt) = x
D
t , gt(st, kt) = g
D
t ,
ct(st, kt) = c
D
t , kt+1 = (1− δ) + xDt ,
with k0 = x
D
0 . In order to estimate the wedges we need to solve the system
above. By construction, the four wedges account for all data movements, i.e., if
we feed the wedges into the system above we recover the original data. Define
Yt = [yt(st, kt), lt(st, kt), xt(st, kt), ct(st, kt)] and Xt = [kt, At, τl,t, τx,t, gt]. The previ-
ous system of equations can be rewritten in the state-space form, as follows:
Y
′
t = DX
′
t + ε
′
Y,t, X
′
t+1 = MX
′
t +Bε
′
X,t+1,
where B, D and M are coefficient matrices and εY and ε
′
X are the vectors of error
terms. After the estimation of wedges, the accounting exercise is done by simulating
the economy to see the relative contribution of each wedge to data movements. This
allows us to understand the drivers of each episode10.
A tale of three recessions
The BCA literature on US recessions has covered the Great Depression, the 1981
recession and the Great Recession11. This paper aims to fill the gap with other three
recessions12: 1973, 1990 and 2001. With that in mind, the BCA exercises uses OECD
data for the US from 1960 to 2014. All variables are at quarterly frequency, except
the population, which is taken annually and the quarterly figures are obtained by
linear interpolation. Below is the list of variables (see Appendix A for more details):
• GDP, Private final consumption expenditure, gross fixed capital formation,
government final consumption expenditure, exports of goods and services and
imports of goods and services (market prices value and deflators for each com-
ponent and total GDP);
• Hours worked per employee;
• Working age population.
10Otsu (2012) raises the question of whether BCA is a good procedure when instead of analyzing
a specific episode, one would like to account for business cycles properties such as cross-correlation
of variables and volatility persistence. He argues that instead of a maximum likelihood estimator,
one should use a moments-based estimator.
11Chari et al. (2007a), Brinca et al. (2016)
12See Federal Reserve Bank (2017) for the US recessions.
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Durable goods are accounted as investment rather than consumption, due to the
fact that such goods keep yielding returns throughout time in the same fashion as
capital expenditure, thus decisions association with that kind of spending are more
related to the investment dynamics, as in Chari et al. (2007a) and Brinca et al.
(2016).
Using the previous data, the first step of BCA is to estimate the wedges. The dis-
tortions are filtered using the HP-filter (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997) and are presented
in Figure 2.113. It is easy to see that the labor wedge is the more volatile distortion.
Moreover, its fall, i.e. a decrease in the marginal value of labor, is associated with
recessive periods in the US.
Figure 2.1: Estimated HP-filtered wedges for the US economy
Data from OECD; Author’s calculations and elaboration.
The efficiency wedge volatility decreases throughout time. Up until the end
of the 1990s the distortion varied more than after the 2000s. The same pattern
is observed in the variability of the investment and the government consumption
wedges. From the prototype model, all the result decisions of economic agents rely
on the realization of the wedges. But which distortion is more important? Following
Chari et al. (2007a), the marginal effect of each wedge is obtained as follows. All
other wedges are held fixed, but the one we are interested in, e.g. if we want to
13The smoothing parameter is 1600.
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see the contribution of the efficiency wedge, we let it to fluctuate, while the others
(labor, investment and government) are held fixed14. Then we can see how much of
the data behavior the model with only one distortion can account for. The procedure
also works by letting two or three wedges varying throughout time as well.
The 1973 Recession
The US economy went through a recession of 16 months after the first oil shock.
BCA helps us to understand the drivers of the episode. For a matter of comparison,
all three aforesaid recessions will be evaluated in a 10 quarters window from its pre-
recession peak. Figure 2.2 presents simulations for both “one wedge economies”,
when only one wedge is allowed to fluctuate, and “one wedge off economies”, when
only one wedge remains constant. The prescribed path of output is confronted with
the observed data. For instance, the expected output path from the model with
only the efficiency wedge follows closely observed data until the third quarter of
1974, corroborating with hypothesis of a recession driven by the efficiency wedge,
whereas after that quarter, the model prescribes a faser recovery, meaning that the
distortion alone is not able to capture the full 10-quarters window episode.
The model with only a labor wedge tells a different story. With only that dis-
tortion the recession would be milder, with a lower initial fall and a faster recovery.
The model with only the investment wedge, on the other hand, prescribes that out-
put would actually rise and its fall (still above the initial value) would occur only
after the first half of the sample period. Finally, output from a model with only
the government consumption wedge would have a smoother and almost monotonic
downward trend.
The literature has worked with a few statistics in order to make the choice of the
better model more rigorous, for instance, the success ratio, the root mean square
error (RMSE), Theil’s U and the linear correlation coefficient. Output is normalized
to a given initial value and the statistics are calculated. For the contribution of
each wedge to the movements of the variables of interest (in this paper the focus
is the output dynamics), Brinca et al. (2016) use a φ statistic, rather than the
four presented before, to evaluate each model. The statistic decomposes output
fluctuation as follows:
φyi =
1/
∑
t(yt − yi,t)2∑
j(1/
∑
t(yt − yi,t)2)
14The wedges are fixed (S¯) at S¯ = P0 ·(I−P )−1, with P0 and P coming from maximum likelihood
estimation and I standing for the identity matrix.
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where i is the subscript for output from each model and j is the total of models
considered. The statistics lies between 0 and 1 and the closest the value is to 1,
the better. As can be seen in Table 2.1, the efficiency wedge alone is responsible
for 62% of output movements, with a secondary role for the labor wedge (28%).
The investment wedge explains only 4%) and the government consumption wedge
accounts for 6%. When considering all but one wedge, the simulated economy
without the investment wedge has the highest statistics and accounts for 96% of
output movements.
Figure 2.2: Model vs Data: output during the 1973 recession
Note: 1973Q1=100; Author’s elaboration.
The 1990 Recession
According to the NBER, the 1990 recession was shorter than the one in 1973, with
a duration of eight months. Not only the length is different, but also the drivers of
the recession. For instance, even though the efficiency wedge still plays the most
important role (explaining 50% of the output fluctuation), the other contributions
are higher. With only a distortion in production, the model prescribes an earlier
recovery. In the model with only the labor wedge, which accounts for 34% of output
dynamics during the 10-quarters window, the recession would begin after the actual
start and would be milder. For the remaining two wedges, the investment-wedge
alone model prescribes a delayed and softer recession, whereas for the model with
14
only the government consumption wedge, output would almost keep steady. Fig-
ure 2.3 presents simulations for both “one wedge economies” and “one wedge off
economies” and the statistics are available in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.3: Model vs Data: output during the 1990 recession
Note: 1990Q2=100; Author’s elaboration.
The 2001 Recession
The 2001 recession has two characteristics that are similar with the 1990 recession:
they both were eight-months episodes with the efficiency wedge explaining around
half of it. Within the BCA analysis, the difference relies on the role of the other
wedges. In this case, the secondary contribution is due to the government consump-
tion wedge, explaining 21% of output dynamics, whereas the labor wedge accounted
for 16% and the investment wedge for 12%, as can be seen in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.4 presents simulations for both “one wedge economies” and “one wedge
off economies”. Output would recover faster than observed data did with only the
efficiency wedge and even faster with only the labor wedge wedge. For the model with
only the investment, output would initially rise and only at the end of the sample
period it would achieve a value under the initial condition. The trajectory for the
model with only the government consumption wedge is similar to the investment
wedge, though smoother.
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Figure 2.4: Model vs Data: output during the 2001 recession
Note: 2001Q1=100; Author’s elaboration.
Table 2.1: The contribution of each wedge in the three episodes (%)
Statistic φe φl φx φg
1973 recession
One wedge economies 62.23 27.63 3.82 6.32
One wedge off economies 37.77 72.37 96.18 93.68
1990 recession
One wedge economies 50.31 33.97 6.38 9.24
One wedge off economies 49.69 66.03 93.61 90.66
2001 recession
One wedge economies 50.49 16.02 12.46 21.04
One wedge off economies 49.51 83.98 87.54 78.96
Notes: The values of the table represent the φ statistic for the
“one wedge economies” and the 1− φ statistic for the “one wedge
off” economies for the four distortions: efficiency wedge (φe), the
labor wedge (φl), the investment wedge (φx) and the government
consumption wedge (φg) .
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The drivers of recessions and expansions
Does the contribution of each wedge change from recessions to expansions? Defining
a recession (expansion) as a peak to trough (trough to peak) change in GDP (defined
by NBER) we may separate the decomposition of the contribution of each wedge
(using the φyi statistic) in these two groups. As can be seen in Table 2.2, on one
hand, the relevance of the efficiency wedge is higher in recessions than in expansions,
accounting for 84% of output movements in the former and 63% in the latter. On
the other hand, the contribution of the labor wedge seems to increase in expansions
(21%) and decrease in recessions (10%).
The investment wedge does not seem relevant to account for output movements
in US. Either in recessions and/or expansions, its contributions is almost nil (2%
and 6%, respectively), a result similar to the one in Chari et al. (2007a). The
government consumption wedge, however, has no straightforward conclusion. Even
though it has played at best a tertiary role (accounting for 10% of output movements
in expansions and only 4% in recessions), the results for the 2001 recession remind
us to be careful when discarding that distortion15.
Table 2.2: The contribution of each wedge in recessions and expansions
Statistic ωe ωl ωx ωg
One wedge economies
Expansions 63.00% 21.15% 5.75% 10.09%
Recessions 83.95% 9.99% 2.29% 3.76%
One wedge off economies
Expansions 37.00% 78.85% 94.25% 89.91%
Recessions 16.05% 90.01% 97.71% 96.24%
Notes: Economies with (without) the efficiency wedge (ωe), the
labor wedge (ωl), the investment wedge (ωx) and the government
consumption wedge (ωg). Recessions (expansions) defined as a neg-
ative (positive) change in GDP (quarter over quarter)
With BCA a researcher aiming to model business cycles would have a proper
guide to which classes of models to pursue. However, there may be some caveats
worth to be highlighted, regarding the limitations of the method.
15The government consumption played any important role in explaining the behavior of macroe-
conomic variables using BCA only in a few papers, as can be seen in Section 2.5.
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2.2.3 Limitations of BCA
After presenting the benefits of BCA in helping researchers to find the best model to
analyze different episodes, it is important to highlight possible pitfalls. Two main
caveats could be risen regarding the technique: one about the model and other
concerning the data used in the model. In the former, BCA (and its extensions
analyzed in Section 2.4) used what seems to be the common ground for DSGE
modeling: a production function, labor supply and demand, capital accumulation
and a resource constraint. But what if the basic framework is wrong? Even though
everything can be mapped into the neoclassical growth model with wedges, the
mappings rely on the definition of the prototype economy. The other reason is
due to the fact that measuring output, consumption, investment, net exports and
government spending in real terms may be a difficult and, more important, an
imprecise task.
What if the model is wrong?
Christiano & Davis (2006) raise two concerns regarding BCA approach. First, the
structure of wedges and the dynamics of innovations may impose some problems.
Since BCA does not identify the source of the shocks, but rather its transmission
mechanisms (Chari et al., 2007a), the authors argue that, due to this fact, some
spillovers are left out, compromising the method and letting it applicable only to a
small subset of reality. Moreover, a wedge could arise from a combination of shocks,
rather than from market imperfection itself.
The second concern is related to the specification of the investment wedge. They
argue that small changes in the environment may harm BCA robustness. For in-
stance, in Chari et al. (2007a) financial frictions manifest themselves as efficiency
rather than investment wedges. This feature would leave some classes of models out
of the prominent candidates’ list. They argue that this is due how the wedge is de-
fined and propose an alternative setting: a capital wedge. They support their claim
by showing differences in relative contribution of the investment wedge with and
without adjustment costs of investment. From a small role in Chari et al. (2007a)
to an important role in Christiano & Davis (2006) with the investment wedge ac-
counting up to 52% of output fluctuations.
Instead of a wedge that looks like a time-varying tax on investment, the capital
wedge looks like a tax (τ kt ) on the gross rate of return on capital (1 +R
k
t+1):
(1 +Rkt+1)(1− τ kt )
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Under this new specification, they advocate in favor of models such as Bernanke
et al. (1999) and Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997), since Christiano & Davis (2006) claim
that not only this wedge represents better their detailed economy, but also under
this new set up, this wedge plays a more important role in explaining short-run
fluctuations. They are also concerned that BCA ignores possible spillover effects of
financial shocks onto other wedges. Furthermore, it is precisely by not accounting
for these spillovers that investment wedges play only a small role in accounting for
output fluctuations.
Chari et al. (2007b) respond to Christiano & Davis (2006) in three fronts. First,
they show that equilibrium allocations are the same with either an investment or a
capital wedge. Moreover, the investment wedge is equivalent to the capital wedge
if the probability distribution of the former is equal under the two representations.
With linearized models this frequently will not be case. The results in Chari et al.
(2007b) and Sˇustek (2011), however, corroborate Chari et al. (2007a) by showing
that there are no important differences between both specifications (Brinca, 2014).
Second, they compare Chari et al. (2007a) with Christiano & Davis (2006)
methodology and conclude that CKM’s have better theoretical foundations. Chris-
tiano & Davis (2006) methodology changes the way forecasts of investment paths
are made, by letting other wedges to vary, and thus its relative importance.
Finally, they argue that VAR decomposition with a financial shock shows a
modest impact of the shock through the investment wedge, reinforcing the results
obtained by business cycle decomposition. Aware of the debate between Christiano
& Davis (2006) and Chari et al. (2007b), some works using BCA (or its extensions),
presented in Section 2.4, verify whether their conclusions are robust to changes in
specification, with either an investment or a capital wedge.
What if data is wrong?
BCA assumes that the fact the neoclassical growth models is not able to account for
data movements is due to some distortions in optimal decisions. But what if data is
wrong? There is the possibility that measured wedges are a product of mismeasure-
ment. Real GDP is obtained by calculating nominal GDP and its the deflator (the
same is true for its components used in BCA, with its own deflator). While nomi-
nal GDP imposes less difficulties, calculating price indices may be a real challenge.
Feldstein (2017) analyses the implications for real GDP calculation and concludes
that the way price indexes are obtained (via marginal costs or hedonic regressions)
usually does not encompass necessary quality changes, biasing the estimations of
productivity. Moreover, the author highlights that there is a delay for incorporating
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new products into GDP accounting.
Another example of mismeasurement relies on intangible capital. In McGrattan
(2015), using a multi-sector general equilibrium model and input-output data for the
U.S., the author tackles this issue by questioning what is the impact of accounting
for intangible capital in national accounts. She finds that without accounting for
intangible capital, one might (wrongly) assume that there is a distortion, whereas
it is only a matter of proper accounting. For instance, not considering spending
with R&D, software and brand construction as investments might lead to the wrong
account of aggregate investment and the other GDP components. The list goes on
and other important components of GDP might be poorly accounted for, such as
the financial sector.
Usually, DSGE models are confronted with national accounts data which takes
into account only official statistics. But what about the economic activities that
may occur in the “shadows”. Schneider et al. (2010) identifies a few influencing the
shadow economy: taxes and social contributions, regulation, public sector services,
the state of the official economy and the labor market. Schneider & Enste (2013)
present a survey on the subject.
After identifying possible pitfalls in the BCA method, the next section addresses
the mappings presented in the literature.
2.3 From accounting to modeling
One of the main contributions of BCA is helping the researcher to identify relevant
distortions in the neoclassical growth model that explain output changes (Chari
et al., 2007a). Once the important wedges are found, the next step is to identify
which models are the best candidates to explain data movements. For each wedge
there is a large class of detailed models that are equivalent to a prototype model
with one or more time-varying wedges that distort the equilibrium decisions. The
literature has dealt with these mappings and the results are presented in this section.
2.3.1 Efficiency wedge
As explained before, the efficiency wedge distorts production decisions. A rise stim-
ulates the demand for production factors by increasing its marginal product whereas
a fall has the opposite effect. There are several modifications in the prototype that
can be mapped into an efficiency wedge. For instance, the efficiency wedge arises
when there are heterogeneous establishments subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In
Lagos (2006), they arise from a frictional labor market (so different firms may have
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distinct hiring opportunities, impacting its own productivity) and in Restuccia &
Rogerson (2008) they are due to different prices faced by individual producers. In
both cases, output is obtained by aggregating individual firms and TFP would be a
result of average productivity.
Another example of a model with an efficiency wedge is Schmitz Jr (2005). In
his model, productivity emerges from changes in work practices. For instance, by
increasing operational time of machines there is a increase in marginal product of
labor. The change in work rules relocates capital, reduces overstaffing and increases
productivity.
An efficiency wedge may arise from the credit market dynamics. In Kiyotaki &
Moore (1997), production depends not only on its factors, but how they are financed.
Therefore, durable assets play a dual role: not only they are production factors, but
also work as collateral for loans. Even temporary shocks to technology or income
distribution can generate large and persistent fluctuations in output due to this link.
Moreover, the distortions in the firms’ and consumers’ optimal decisions geneate an
investment wedge.
Other sources of financial intermediation are explored in Lu (2013), within a
slightly different framework (a computable neoclassical model). He concludes that
improvements in financial efficiency generally results in higher steady state output.
The reason is that there is a higher percentage of household savings intermediated,
not an increase in savings rates per se. In his model, the distortions from the
neoclassical equilibrium are materialized into efficiency and investment wedges.
Finally, open-economy variables may be responsible for the efficiency wedge.
For instance, Kim (2014) studies import-price shocks on output and productivity,
applied to the Korean Crisis (1997-1998). He finds that prices of imported goods rel-
ative to the prices of domestic goods impacts output and productivity. Therefore,
import-prices and tariffs create distortions that can be expressed as an efficiency
wedge. In Brinca & Costa Filho (2018b), an international crisis can be transmit-
ted via an efficiency wedge due to the share of imported intermediate goods in the
domestic output. The Great Recession in Mexico is an example of it. In Chari
et al. (2005) a model of sudden stops generates an efficiency wedge by introduc-
ing a advance-payment constraining. If wages are paid before production and the
realization of shocks, a distortion on production arises, as well as a labor wedge.
2.3.2 Labor wedge
Increases in the labor wedge stimulate the labor supply via greater marginal income
associated with it. As stated before, BCA does not separate supply and demand
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shocks. For instance, an economy with sticky wages is equivalent to the prototype
model with labor wedges. In the work of Bordo et al. (2000), lagged wage adjustment
(a` la Taylor contracts) played a significant role in intensifying the downturn during
the Great Depression. Countries that remained on the gold standard were forced to
tight monetary policy, whereas sticky nominal wages produced larger increases in
real wages for the gold bloc countries and therefore greater output contraction. Their
economy, with sticky wages and monetary shocks, is equivalent to the neoclassical
growth model with a labor wedge.
In the economy of Cole & Ohanian (2001), unions and antitrust policy shocks
generate a labor wedge. Focusing on the policies implemented as part of the New
Deal program, the authors find that the monopolistic power of labor unions may have
caused more harm than good during the Great Depression, according the authors.
By trying to balance out the impact of the contraction in output, the unions rouse
real wages (by not allowing nominal wages to fall as much as inflation), diminishing
the demand for labor even more. In the neoclassical growth model, this is equivalent
of a distortion on the intratemporal decision of work.
There is also the possibility of a labor wedge from intangible capital. For in-
stance, the investments made in the relationship between firm and its customer may
generate a procyclical distortion in labor-leisure decisions as in Gourio & Rudanko
(2014).
In Gali et al. (2007), a measure of the deviation from the efficient-level output
is created. This “gap”, as the authors call it, is decomposed into a price markup
and a wage markup. They show the wage markup accounts for the greatest part
of the variation. They find that the wage markup is important to account for data
movements and they produce equilibrium allocations similar to the ones from a
prototype economy with a labor wedge.
Another possibility for generating a labor wedge is by introducing search and
matching frictions. By introducing preference shifts, Hall (1997) creates a model
with a labor wedge. The introduction of technology shifts and changes in government
purchases also influence output, via an efficiency and a government consumption
wedge, respectively. In order to understand labor wedge variation, Cheremukhin &
Restrepo-Echavarria (2014) and Skibin´ska (2016) decompose the distortion. Chere-
mukhin & Restrepo-Echavarria (2014) finds that the wedge is to a large extent
explained by the matching efficiency. For instance, an inefficient labor market in
Poland and financial frictions in Czech republic explain the labor wedge volatility
in Skibin´ska (2016). Complementary, Mulligan (2002) creates measures for labor-
leisure that are base on taxes and subsidies, labor market regulation, monopoly
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unionism and search frictions.
If we introduce household production as in Karabarbounis (2014), a labor wedge
may arise from the between marginal utility due to the consumption of market
produced and household produced goods and services. Finally, a model with gender
and marital status heterogeneity may also generate a labor wedge and, as Cociuba
& Ueberfeldt (2015) show, it is able to account for the trends in hours of work in
the U.S..
2.3.3 Investment wedge
In a general equilibrium set up, the intertemporal choice between present and future
consumption provides the optimal amount of capital supplied. If there is a friction
in the investment market, households may increase the supply of capital due to
an increase in the marginal income associated with it. Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997)
present a computable general equilibrium model with credit market frictions arising
from agency costs and equilibrium allocations are similar to a benchmark economy
with an investment wedge. However, according to Inaba & Nutahara (2009), this
is only the case if adjustment costs are introduced. They find that distortions in
the intertemporal decisions (without adjustment costs) only delay the propagation
of shocks, while the efficiency wedge is behind output fluctuations.
Adjustment costs in a “time-to-build” dynamics as in Kydland & Prescott (1982)
also produce an investment wedge. In a general equilibrium set up, investment takes
time to be available as a production factor (capital). Under this modification, they
can explain the cyclical variances of a set of economic time series, and the covariance
between real output and the others series. The model seems to fit post-war data for
the U.S. economy. Typically, BCA is now done with adjustment costs (see Brinca
et al. 2016).
Credit market, money and price stickiness into a DSGE model produces an finan-
cial accelerator dynamics. For instance, Bernanke et al. (1999) find that financial
intermediation influence aggregate fluctuations due to shocks on the capital accumu-
lation process, as in Cooper & Ejarque (2000), an investment wedge arises. When
borrowers face different agency costs of financing investment due to its net worth,
the amplified effect on output in both upturns and downturns arises from distortions
a la investment wedges as in Bernanke (1995).
International financial markets may also produce investment wedges. For exam-
ple, in Chari et al. (2005) a model with endogenous collateral constraints on foreign
debt may distort the Euler equation.
Finally, Tutino (2011) explores the possibility that investment and labor wedges
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arising from rational inattention. If people pay little attention to wealth changes at a
high frequency, this would imply their intertemporal choices, as well as intratemporal
ones, would deviate from the optimal path designed by rational expectations. This
could be the cause if information processing is constrained.
2.3.4 Government consumption wedge
In the neoclassical growth model used as the benchmark for business cycle account-
ing, the government consumption enters in the resource constrain, distorting the
division of output between consumption and investment. In a open-economy set up,
the wedge is equal to government spending plus next exports.
Despite the direct introduction of the wedge in the resource constraint, the liter-
ature has developed other ways for the government consumption wedge to manifest
itself. For instance, in Chari et al. (2005), the wedge appears when introducing
country’s collateral constraint on foreign borrowing. By analyzing the effects of
sudden stops via constraints on foreign borrowing, the authors show that a sudden
stop defined by the increase in net exports would induce a rise in the government
wedge. Either state-contingent or uncontingent foreign debt as in Mendoza (2006)
might produce a government wedge too.
Finally, the introduction of capital adjustment costs and intermediate imported
goods as in Brinca & Costa Filho (2018b) also produces a government consumption
wedge that is not only government spending. The literature on mapping wedges
into detailed economies is summarized in tables 2.3 and 2.4.
2.4 Beyond Business Cycle Accounting
BCA opened an avenue of research. Some authors extended CKM’s approach to
other dimensions, analyzing monetary issues (BCA deals only with the real side of
the economy, though it can be mapped to monetary models) and other frameworks
such as open economies and the relationship between economies.
2.4.1 Monetary Business Cycle Accounting
Sˇustek (2011) prosed an extension of BCA that accounts for the interaction between
the real and nominal sides of the economy (BCA deals only with real variables) by
introducing inflation and the short-term interest rate into the benchmark economy.
The reasoning is the same: assume the basic framework with what is as close as it
can be of a consensus and use the distortions for accommodating the idiosyncrasies
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of each economy. Departing from the same utility maximization problem as in Chari
et al. (2007a), the household’s budget constraint is modified to encompass real bond
holdings as follows:
ct(s
t) + (1 + τxt(s
t))xt(s
t) + (1 + τbt(s
t))[
bt
(1 +Rt)pt
− bt−1
pt
] =
(1− τlt(st))wt(st)lt(st) + rt(st)kt(st) + Tt(st),
where τbt is the asset market wedge, b stands for bond holdings, R represents the
nominal interest rate and p is the price level. The rest is the same as before.
Furthermore, the central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule according to:
Rt(s
t) = (1− ρy)[R + ωy(ln yt(st)− ln y) + ωpi(pit(st)− pi)] + ρRRt−1(st−1) + R˜t(st),
where ρR is the weight of the nominal interest rate at t − 1, and ρy is the weight
of both output gap (ln yt − ln y) and deviations of inflation (pit(st) = ln pt(st) −
ln pt−1(st−1)) from the steady state level (pi), given central banks sensitivity of both
(captured by the parameters ωy and ωpi, respectively), plus the Taylor rule wedge,
R˜t(s
t). The equilibrium is thus given by equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), the nominal
interest rate rule, a production function and the optimal decision for bond holdings:
∑
st+1
β
Uc,t+1(s
t+1)
Uc,t(st)
1 + τb,t+1(s
t+1)
1 + τb,t(st)
pt(s
t)
pt+1(st+1)
[1 +Rt(s
t)] = 1, (2.10)
Sˇustek (2011) then analyzes what types of distortions explain the observed dy-
namics of inflation and the short-term interest rate. He also studies the lead-lag
relationship of interest rate and inflation with output. This prototype framework
encompasses a large class of monetary business cycle models 16. Notice that after
introducing two additional equations, two more wedges emerged: the asset market
wedge and the monetary policy wedge.
The asset market wedge distorts the Euler equation for nominal bonds as if it
was a tax on nominal holdings. The monetary policy wedge arises from deviation
from the Taylor rule. If the Central Bank is worried with something else rather
than only inflation and output gap, the wedge emerges. For instance, it may arise
from a regime change due to a time-varying inflation target as in Gavin et al. (2007).
These two wedges affect only nominal variables, whereas the original four affect both
nominal and real variables.
Sˇustek (2011) finds that inflation and interest rates are negatively correlated with
16E.g. McGrattan (1999); Ireland (2004); Smets & Wouters (2007)
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future output and positively with the past one. Moreover, the drivers of inflation
and interest rates are the same. Interestingly though, he concludes that sticky prices
are not the determinant of the lead-lag dynamics. Furthermore, the efficiency and
the asset market wedges are the most promising to capture the dynamics of US data.
The author also provides some mappings. For instance, models with sticky prices
generate labor and investment wedges. The idea is that imperfect competition in
final goods market distorts the markets for production factors given that factor
prices are no longer equal to its marginal product. Inflation is affected in two ways.
First, for instance, a negative demand shock that propagates in the economy as
an increase in the labor wedge. This would reduce the labor supply (due to the
higher tax on labor), increasing inflation. Second, a rise in the investment wedge
would decrease aggregate investment, reducing inflation. Calvo-style price setting
generates efficiency, investment and labor wedges. If we add adjustment costs, the
model has also a government consumption wedge.
Finally, according to Sˇustek (2011), in order to have an asset market wedge, one
could introduce a limited participation in asset markets a la Christiano & Eichen-
baum (1992), where some agents are excluded from the money market. The wedge
acts like taxes on nominal bond holdings and distorts the Euler equation for bonds17.
2.4.2 Open-economy Business Cycle Accounting
Another modification of BCA is to consider the prototype model as a small open-
economy. As in original BCA, the idea is to depart from a basic common ground
and introduce distortions in optimal decisions. However, neoclassical small open-
economy models may have a problem. The steady state may have a random walk
component, which not only implies that temporary shocks have long-run effects,
but also imposes computational hurdles (Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe, 2003). For avoid-
ing this issue, some modifications should be done to introduce stationarity. Otsu
(2010b), Lama (2011) and Hevia (2014) chose adjustment costs18.
There is some difference between Lama (2011) and Hevia (2014). For example,
the former uses annual data, while the latter uses quarterly data. More important
though is the fact that Lama (2011) assumes that the wedges follow an AR processes,
rather than a VAR process as in Hevia (2014), removing possible spillovers amongst
wedges.
17See Fuerst (1992) for this so-called “liquidity effect”.
18See Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003) for the models specification and the discussion of the
induction of stationarity in small open-economy models. Otsu (2010b) has a slightly different
specification then Lama (2011).
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Departing from the same utility maximization problem as in Chari et al. (2007a),
the household’s budget constraint is modified to encompass foreign debt holdings as
follows:
ct(s
t) + (1 + τxt(s
t))xt(s
t) + dt(s
t) + Φ(dt+1) + Θ(
xt
kt
)kt(s
t) =
(1− τlt(st))wt(st)lt(st) + rt(st)kt(st) + Γdt+1(s
t+1)
R(1 + τd,t(st))
+ Tt(s
t),
where d is foreign debt, R is the world interest rate, Φ(.) represents the debt adjust-
ment costs, Θ(.) stands for capital adjustment costs, γn is the population growth
rate, γ is the technological progress and Γ = (1 + γn)(1 + γ). The rest is the same
as before. The trade balance is defined as
tbt(s
t) = dt(s
t)− Γdt+1(s
t+1)
R(1 + τd,t(st))
+ Φ(dt+1).
The resource constraint that in BCA is represented by equation (2.4) is aug-
mented to encompass the open-economy set up:
ct(s
t) + xt(s
t) + gt(s
t) + tbt(s
t) + Θ(
xt
kt
)kt(s
t) = yt(s
t). (2.11)
The equilibrium is thus given by equations (2.1) and (2.2), the definition of trade
balance, the resource constraint, a production function, the capital Euler equation
(equation (2.3) adjusted to considerer adjustment costs in debt and capital) and the
Euler equation in foreign debt:
∑
st+1
βUc,t+1(s
t+1) = Uc,t(s
t)(
Γ
R(1 + τd,t(st))
− Φd(dt+1)). (2.12)
Under this framework, the country is a net debtor, paying interests on debt.
Therefore, a new wedge arises: the bond wedge, a premium on foreign bonds interest
rate19. If the bond wedge rises, borrowing abroad becomes more expensive, so there
is less capital inflow and, holding everything else constant, financial account balance
should diminish, while trade balance improves (Otsu, 2010b). A rise in the borrowing
costs decreases consumption and leisure, since return on investment must be equal to
the international borrowing cost. If leisure decreases, the amount of labor increases,
hence a rise in the bond wedge augments output.
In an open-economy business cycle accounting (OBCA), the efficiency wedge
may arise from models with working capital constraint, such as Christiano et al.
(2004). Even without technological change, the interest rate and import prices
19Otsu (2010b)) calls it foreign debt wedge.
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alone generate an efficiency wedge (Lama, 2011). Otsu (2010b) highlights that an
intermediate-good structure within a small open economy may also generate an
efficiency wedge, as well as labor reallocation from more productive sectors to less
productive led to a decline in TFP, as in Benjamin & Meza (2009).
A labor wedge may arise by introducing working capital on labor. If firm’s
borrowing is related to demand of labor, labor costs will depend also on gross interest
rates, not only on the wage rate as in Neumeyer & Perri (2005). Also, a model with
cash-in-advance constraint on consumption goods and monetary shocks as Cooley
& Hansen (1989) creates the wedge.
The investment wedge, as well as in the BCA model, arises from financial fric-
tions. Credit market distortions, financial accelerators and agency costs produce the
distortion in the neoclassical framework. This wedge maps into the works of Gertler
et al. (2007), Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano & Davis (2006).
The bond wedge emerges from models with collateral constraints. Limits on
international borrowing lead to interest rate premiums (the wedge), for instance,
in episodes of sudden stops (Mendoza, 2006; Mendoza & Smith, 2006). Finally, a
model with financial frictions such as Mendoza (2010) generates the five wedges
(Hevia, 2014).
2.4.3 International Business Cycle Accounting
BCA was also extended to embody economic relationship between two countries. In
Otsu (2010a), a two country version of Chari et al. (2007a) is developed. Besides
the four standard wedges, which the author calls CKM wedges, even though he
separates government spending from net exports. Departing from the same utility
maximization problem as in Chari et al. (2007a), the household’s budget constraint
is modified to encompass the two-country dynamics for country i ∈ {A,B}:
cit(s
t) + (1 + τ ixt(s
t))xit(s
t) + pit(s
t)
∑
st+1t |st
qt(s
t+1
t |st)dit+1(st+1t |st) + Θ(
xt
kt
)kt(s
t) =
(1− τlt(st))wt(st)lt(st) + rt(st)kt(st) + pit(st)dit(st) + Tt(st),
where qt is the price of one-period contingent claims and the rest is the same as
before. The introduction of an international financial market imposes the following
constraint:
[qt(s
t+1
t |st)dAt+1(st+1t |st)− dAt (st)]+
[qt(s
t+1
t |st)dBt+1(st+1t |st)− dBt (st)] = τtb,t(st),
(2.13)
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where τtb,t is the international trade wedge. International balance implies:
tbAt (s
t) + tbBt (s
t)/pt(s
t) = τtb,t, (2.14)
where pt(s
t) is the international price wedge, defined as follows:
pt(s
t) =
pBt (s
t)
pAt (s
t)
. (2.15)
The international price wedge disturbs cross-country risk sharing, by not allowing
marginal utility of consumption to be equal across countries due to, for instance,
trade or transactions costs. The international trade wedge is a distortion on the
international resource constraint, capturing what is in the aggregate trade balance,
evaluated at international prices, that is not accounted for the model, e.g., trade
with other countries.
The international price wedge may arise from a limitation on international risk
sharing due to incomplete capital markets as in Baxter & Crucini (1995). A two-
country, two-good model such as Backus et al. (1994), Stockman & Tesar (1995) or
Wen (2007) can also generate this wedge. Rewrite The resource constraint is defined
as below:
cit(s
t) + xit(s
t) + git(s
t) + tbit(s
t) + Θ(
xit(s
t)
kit(s
t)
)kit(s
t) = yit(s
t). (2.16)
Under this set up, some features observed in the data are replicated in Otsu
(2010a). For instance, the low cross-country consumption correlation, due to distor-
tions in the international financial market. By adding labor and investment wedges
one could avoid production factors perfect mobility. If the international price wedge
increases, the price of domestic relative to foreign resources also increases, creating
a negative domestic wealth effect. Therefore, consumption and leisure will fall at
home, while consumption and leisure will arise abroad. Moreover, domestic labor
will increase, augmenting output.
A rise in international trade wedges works similarly as an increase in the gov-
ernment wedge, affecting the resource constraint, but at a global level. If the wedge
soars, international claims accumulation decreases (that can be seen as an outflow
of savings), diminishing consumption and leisure, stimulating labor and output.
This section presented the extensions of BCA. Even though the original Chari
et al. (2007a) wedges can be mapped into different models accounting for nominal
and real variables, changing the basic framework to incorporate small open-economy
dynamics and the economic relationship between countries seems to be a step further
on the decomposition of original wedges (see tables 2.3 and 2.4 for the literature
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mappings for BCA and its extensions). Monetary BCA helps to understand the
transmission of monetary policy shocks, for instance. In Open-economy BCA, the
impact of sudden stops and the reasoning for current account balance improvements
are better explored. Moreover, by separating government consumption from net
exports, we have an additional international transmission channel.
The use of BCA on business cycles analysis has grown fast throughout time. The
next section is dedicated to a detailed analysis of the results literature has found so
far. With a broad sample of papers working with BCA (and its extensions), with a
diversity of countries and episodes studied, we can explore possible patters on the
relative contribution of wedges.
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Table 2.3: Wedges and mappings: efficiency and labor wedges
Wedge Mapping Reference
Efficiency Production units subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Lagos (2006)
Efficiency Establishments with different productivity. Restuccia & Rogerson (2008)
Efficiency Productivity arising from work practices. Schmitz Jr (2005)
Efficiency Credit limits and asset prices amplifying shocks. Kiyotaki & Moore (1997)
Efficiency Labor and investment frictions with technology shocks. Zanetti (2008)
Efficiency Import-price shocks impacting output and productivity. Kim (2014)
Efficiency More efficient financial intermediation enhancing growth. Lu (2013)
Efficiency Intermediate imported goods. Brinca & Costa Filho (2018b)
Efficiency Working capital constraint (OBCA). Christiano et al. (2004)
Efficiency Advance-payment Constraint. Chari et al. (2005)
Efficiency Financial frictions (OBCA). Mendoza (2010)
Labor Sticky wages. Bordo et al. (2000)
Labor Unions and antitrust policy shocks. Cole & Ohanian (2001)
Labor Price markup and a wage markup. Gali et al. (2007)
Labor Search frictions. Hall (1997), Cheremukhin & Restrepo-Echavarria (2014), Skibin´ska (2016)
Labor Household production. Karabarbounis (2014)
Labor Intangible capital. Gourio & Rudanko (2014)
Labor Taxes and subsidies influencing labor-leisure decisions. Mulligan (2002)
Labor Working capital on labor (OBCA). Neumeyer & Perri (2005)
Labor Cash-in-advance constraint on consumption goods (OBCA). Neumeyer & Perri (2005)
Labor Advance-payment Constraint. Chari et al. (2005)
Labor Financial frictions (OBCA). Mendoza (2010)
31
Table 2.4: Wedges and mapping: investment, government, asset markets, bond and international price
Wedge Mapping Reference
Investment Credit market with agency costs. Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997)
Investment Adjustment costs. Inaba & Nutahara (2009) and Kydland & Prescott (1982)
Investment Financial accelerator: credit market, money and price stickiness. Bernanke et al. (1999), Gali et al. (2007)
Investment Shocks on the capital accumulation process. Cooper & Ejarque (2000)
Investment Rational inattention. Tutino (2011)
Investment Financial frictions (OBCA). Mendoza (2010)
Investment Investment-specific technological change. Greenwood et al. (1997)
Investment Bank collateral constraints. Kiyotaki & Moore (1997), Gertler et al. (2010)
Investment Collateral constraints on foreign debt. Chari et al. (2005)
Government Constraint on foreign borrowing Chari et al. (2005)
Government Uncontingent Mendoza (2006)
Asset market Tax on nominal holdings. McGrattan (1999), Ireland (2004), Smets & Wouters (2007)
Asset market Limited participation in asset markets. Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992)
Monetary policy Deviations from the Taylor rule. McGrattan (1999), Ireland (2004), Smets & Wouters (2007)
Monetary policy Time-varying in inflation target of a regime change. Gavin et al. (2007)
Monetary policy Financial frictions. Mendoza (2010)
Bond Interest rate premium on foreign bonds. Mendoza (2010)
Bond Collateral constraint. Mendoza (2006)
Bond Financial frictions. Mendoza (2010)
International price Limitation on international risk sharing. Baxter & Crucini (1995)
International price Two-country, two-good model. Backus et al. (1994)
International price Tradable/nontradable separation. Stockman & Tesar (1995)
International price Two-country model model with tastes shocks. Stockman & Tesar (1995), Wen (2007)
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2.5 Common findings
Several papers use BCA method to analyze macroeconomic fluctuations and to shed
some light on the possible paths for modeling and explaining short-run dynamics.
With a few exceptions, the focus has being on explaining downturns and the recov-
eries after. Table 2.5 presents BCA applications divided by country.
It is easy to see that BCA and its extensions have been used in two different types
of analysis, either a single country, one or a few episodes, or within an international
comparison, either in comprehensive studies as Brinca et al. (2016), Brinca (2014)
and Gerth & Otsu (2016), or regional comparisons like Lama (2011) and Ohanian
et al. (2015).
Table 2.5: BCA (and extensions) literature by country/groups of countries
Country Reference
Argentina Cavalcanti et al. (2008)
Brazil Graminho (2006); Brinca & Costa Filho (2018a)
Bulgaria Vasilev (2016)
Canada Hevia (2014)
Chile Simonovska & So¨derling (2008)
China He et al. (2009); Gao & Ljungwall (2009)
France Bridji (2013)
India Gao & Ljungwall (2009)
Italy Orsi & Turino (2014)
Japan Cunha (2006); Kobayashi & Inaba (2006); Saijo (2008); Chakraborty (2009)
Korea Sarabia (2007), Hevia (2014), Hirata & Otsu (2011)
Mexico Meza (2008), Hevia (2014), Sarabia (2008), Brinca & Costa Filho (2018b)
Paraguay Hnatkovska & Koehler-Geib (2015)
Portugal Cavalcanti (2007), Iskrev (2013)
Spain Lo´pez & Garc´ıa (2014)
Sweden Brinca (2013)
Turkey Elgin & C¸ic¸ek (2011)
United Kingdom Kersting (2008), Chadha & Warren (2012)
United States Chari et al. (2007a), Ohanian (2010), Macnamara (2016)
Asian countries Hirata & Otsu (2011), Cho & Doblas-Madrid (2013), Otsu (2010a), Ohanian et al. (2015)
BRIC countries Chakraborty & Otsu (2013)
European countries Gerth & Otsu (2016)
European Union Kolasa (2013)
Latin America Lama (2011), Ohanian et al. (2015)
OECD countries Brinca et al. (2016), Brinca (2014)
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2.5.1 Developed economies
The initial efforts on BCA were to explain two major episodes for the US economy:
the Great Depression and the 1982 recession. Chari et al. (2007a) concludes that
labor and efficiency wedges, respectively, are important to account for the economic
fluctuations in both periods. The investment wedge plays a tertiary role, while the
government consumption wedge plays none. They change the framework to see the
robustness of their conclusions. First, they introduce variable capital utilization.
Since the number of workers is constant, the variation comes from the workweek. It
does not change the small contribution of investment wedge. Then, they try different
labor supply elasticities. This changes the size of the measured labor wedge, but
not of the investment wedge. Finally, they introduce investment adjustment costs
and there is still a modest role for the investment wedge. Their findings are aligned
with the importance of frictions in financial markets for business cycle fluctuations,
since input-financing frictions may produce their results via efficiency wedges20.
The Great Recession in the US was also focus of analysis with BCA. Ohanian
(2010) investigates what are the causes of the US 2007-2009 recession that make it
not only different from other postwar US recessions, but also from other developed
economies recessions. Usually, the driver is the efficiency wedge, but in the 2007-
2009 episodes, however, the recession was mainly due to a large decline in labor
input (labor wedge). The author raises the hypothesis that economic policy may be
behind this. By raising tax on labor, labor supply is affected, diminishing output.
When comparing the relevance of wedges for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan
and UK, he concludes that the efficiency wedge is behind their recessions.
Instead of proceeding the usual decomposition to access which wedge accounts
for most of output movements, Macnamara (2016) is interest in verifying firms entry
and exit rates. With that in mind, he uses BCA to construct measures of aggregate
shocks and finds that not only labor shocks (wedge) account for movements in entry
and exit rates, it also explains the slow recovery in employment after the 2008
financial crisis. The efficiency wedge explanation power is almost null.
Brinca et al. (2016) finds the same result for the US Great Recession: the pro-
tagonism of the labor wedge. In a comprehensive study of the Great Recession in 24
OECD countries, the main driver of the recession was the efficiency wedge, whereas
for a few exceptions (US, Spain, Ireland and Iceland) the labor wedge was the most
important distortion.
20Before Chari et al. (2007a), some works dealt with business cycle analysis using only a few
wedges. For example, Chari et al. (2002) with all but the government wedge, finds an important
role for the efficiency wedge, followed by the labor wedge in explaining the Great Depression.
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In a study close to Brinca et al. (2016), Gerth & Otsu (2016) analyze the Great
Recession in 29 European countries. The authors find that the efficiency wedge is the
main driver of the poor post-crisis performance, with a few exceptions for Southern
Europe countries, in which the investment and labor wedges play more important
roles. Using cross-country regressions of wedges on financial variables, they find
that non-performing loans, market capitalization and house price index are nega-
tively correlated with the efficiency wedge which corroborates with the hypothesis
of resource misallocation triggered by a financial crisis.
Kolasa (2013) raises an interesting question. If business cycle synchronization
is important within a currency union, what explains differences in business cycles
between Central and Eastern European countries and the euro area? He uses BCA
for identifying the sources of divergences and convergences between the euro area
and Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia21. He finds that there
has been some convergence, mostly due to synchronization in the efficiency wedge,
though the main differences arise from labor and investment wedge. The government
wedge does not help to explain data movements.
Still in Europe, Bridji (2013) deals with the Great Depression in France. He
finds that the efficiency wedge explains fluctuations in output and most of the fall
in labor and investment. Investment and labor wedges played secondary roles. The
investment wedge accounts for the fall in consumption and the labor wedge explains
why the economy did not get back on track after 1936. Regarding the efficiency
wedge, the money multiplier dynamics is the most promising explanation and was
responsible for the worsening in the economic activity in 1929-1932 as due to capital
underutilization. Moreover, they concluded that the labor wedge decline is due to
the wage markup. Financial frictions as in Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997) explain the fall
in consumption, augmenting the importance of the investment wedge for explaining
consumption movements.
The United Kingdom’s 1980 recession was driven by the labor and the efficiency
wedges, with a special role of the former during the recovery (Kersting, 2008). The
investment wedge plays a minor role by smoothing the fall in the labor market. The
author concludes that labor market reforms, including those reducing the role of
unions in the wage negotiation process, were justified. He says that distortions in
the labor market played a large role in causing the recession and his simulations
point towards the idea that the recovery was driven by their removals.
Chadha & Warren (2012) also study the UK economy, looking for the causes of
UK’s Great Recession. The recession was driven by an investment and consump-
21Some euro area countries were excluded due to data limitations.
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tion fall, whereas investment was the main responsible for the recovery. They also
perform a counter-factual analysis22. By generating artificial data from detailed
economy composed by a New Keynesian set up with credit market frictions via
Monte Carlo simulation, they find that bubble shocks manifest themselves as an
efficiency, rather than and investment wedge.
The efficiency and the labor wedges also help to explain economic growth in Italy
since the middle 90s onwards (Orsi & Turino, 2014). The country experienced labor
market reforms and changes in tax rates and the authors conclude that this might
be the reason behind the fact that euro-area countries grew, while Italy did not.
Market reforms that aimed to increase flexibility such as loosening regulation on non-
permanent labor contracts affect directly the labor supply (causing the labor wedge).
They may also affect allocation of production inputs, which distorts production
decisions, creating efficiency wedges. Insufficient R & D investments that cause a
fall in productivity may also create this wedge.
In Cavalcanti (2007), the author examines the economic slowdown from 1979 to
1985 and from 1992 to 1996 in Portugal, a period in which the country experience
major economic changes, such as joining the European Union. He finds that the
recovery in Portuguese output until the first years of the 1990s can be attributed to
economic efficiency improvements. The author also finds that less distorted labor
policies would help Portuguese growth (a small open-economy set up does not change
the conclusions). Iskrev (2013) also analyze Portuguese business cycles, extending
the sample. He also finds that the efficiency wedge is the most important distortion,
even though labor wedge is also necessary for explaining short-run fluctuations.
Lo´pez & Garc´ıa (2014) study the Spanish business cycle during the transition to
demacracy in 1977 and the Great Recession. For both episodes, they find the labor
wedge is the key component, while the efficiency wedge plays - at most - a secondary
role. The other wedges are quantitatively nil. By simulating a DSGE model with
shocks to labor and efficiency wedge, they failed to reproduce relative consumption
volatility, but they generated a negative correlation between productivity and real
wage. Analyzing the causes of the distortion labeled as labor wedge their regres-
sions points towards the importance of unemployment benefits, tax rates and the
centralization of collective bargaining.
The Swedish business cycles registered two major recessions: on the early 1990s
and 2008 financial crisis. Using MBCA, Brinca (2013) studies the drivers of each
episode. He finds that the 1990’s real state crisis translated into a structural change
22They expand their sample until 2015 using forecast series to avoid usual problems with filtering
estimation.
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in the wedges, pointing towards a domestic-originated episode. In the 2008 crisis,
firms idle capacity and costs on firing labor discouraged firms from firing workers
even with a lack of demand, leading to a decline in economic activity.. For explaining
the business cycles associated with the two episodes, the efficiency, labor, monetary
policy wedges are the most important, followed by investment and asset market.
After experiencing a Depression-like dynamics in the 1990s, Ireland recovered fast
and its performance during the 1990s draw some attention. Ahearne et al. (2006)
use BCA to analyze the Great Depression of Ireland. They find an important role
for the efficiency wedge and a medium role for the labor wedge and almost no role
for the investment and government consumption wedge, aligned with what Chari
et al. (2007a) found for the US.
For Japan, the results in Kobayashi & Inaba (2006), using a BCA framework
(with perfect foresight), are slightly different than those in Chari et al. (2007a).
Using the capital wedge instead of the investment wedge, their contrast is regarding
the role of investment/financial wedges in explaining the Great Depression. They
conclude that the capital wedge was the driver of the episode.
Contrasting with Kobayashi & Inaba (2006), Chakraborty (2009) and Cunha
(2006) finds that output movements in Japan are mainly explained by the efficiency
and the investment wedges. Output fall in the 1990s seem to be due to declining
productivity, labor market frictions and investment frictions.
Saijo (2008) also finds that besides the importance of the efficiency wedge for
explaining output fall, the labor and investment wedges are also important for un-
derstanding the slow recovery. He argues that government policies increased firms’
monopoly power (markups increase during the depression, generating both labor
and investment wedges), while no bargaining power was given to the labor force. If
there was no increase in markups, counterfactual evidence implies a output recovery.
Hirata & Otsu (2011) investigate the economic relationship between Japan and
Korea and Taiwan. In a IBCA set up a two-country, two-good model in which the
efficiency wedge manifest itself as productivity in intermediates goods output, rather
than TFP, implying that a relative price change in intermediate goods can distort
production decisions, they conclude that growth in the Asian Tigers productivity
generated positive spillover effects on Japanese growth via terms of trade. The
efficiency wedge is the most important driver, followed by the labor wedge. The
international wedges (price and trade) and play a tertiary role, implying that the
international link of the positive spillovers did not manifest via international capital
markets (international price wedge) or on the quantity dimension of international
goods markets (international trade wedge).
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Finally, in a more comprehensive paper, with a sample composed by 22 OECD
countries, Brinca (2014) analyzes what wedges systematically account for business
cycle fluctuations. Instead of focusing on specific episodes, he implements BCA
for each country (with same parameters so the differences in the wedges are not
due to different parameterization) and calculates the empirical distributions of the
averages for the HP-filtered trend and cycle wedges. He finds that the efficiency
wedge explains output and aggregate investment movements, whereas the labor
wedge is important for modeling the dynamics of hours of work. Wedges cross-
country correlations are correlated with geographic distance and trade openness.
2.5.2 Emerging markets
The literature has found some differences on the BCA results between developed
and emerging markets (EM) short-run fluctuations, specially in volatility. In a pro-
totype economy this is translated into more volatile wedges. Moreover, the relative
importance of wedges may change. For instance, Hevia (2014) tackles precisely
the question of what are the differences between developed and Emerging Markets
fluctuations using an OBCA framework. Using Canada and Mexico, he finds in
the former an important role of efficiency and labor wedges, although bond and
investment wedges contribute to explain aggregate investment, trade balance and
consumption. In the latter, output movements are driven by efficiency, labor and
bond wedges. These results are important because even though the efficiency wedge
very often is an important driver (see tables 2.6 and 2.7), its relative contribution
(and of the other wedges) may change not amongst episodes, but also among devel-
opment stages.
Sudden stops would naturally be associated with a prominent role for the gov-
ernment consumption wedge (Chari et al. (2005) discusses this issue), nevertheless,
Sarabia (2008) finds that efficiency and labor wedges are the most important distor-
tions driving short-run output fluctuations in Mexico in periods of crises, in line with
the results of Hevia (2014). For the 1995 crisis, the role of the investment wedge
is higher than for the 2001 recession, but is still a minor role. Under a variable
capital utilization framework, the efficiency wedge still plays the most important
role, though it explains a lower fraction of output fluctuations in the 2001 recession.
The relative importance of the labor wedge rises in the 1995 crisis, but falls in the
2001 episode.
Meza (2008) complements the analysis of the 1995 GDP Contraction in Mexico
by asking what is the role of fiscal policy in the episode. Using a version of BCA that
allows for variable capital utilization (i.e., different production function) and a fiscal
38
policy model with government consumption and a tax on consumption to decompose
BCA wedges, he quantifies the role of fiscal policy by constructing counterfactual
wedges. His conclusion is that fiscal policy has a significant contribution, specially
via tax increases.
Brinca & Costa Filho (2018b) analyze the transmission of international crises and
focus on Mexico’s 1995 and 2008 crises, complementing Hevia (2014), Meza (2008)
and Sarabia (2008). Adjusting investment and consumption data as in Brinca et al.
(2016), they find that the efficiency wedge also drives fluctuations in output. An
equivalence is proposed between the prototype economy with an efficiency and an
investment wedge and an open-economy model with imported goods into the final
goods production function in order to understand the episode. Not only the model
is able to reproduce output path in both episodes, but also it reveals a “hidden”
international transmission mechanism within the efficiency wedge.
Ohanian et al. (2015) questions the usual international-market-frictions expla-
nations for capital inflows in East Asia and Latin America. Using a different type
of IBCA, built on a three-country neoclassical DSGE model (with Latin American,
East Asia and the rest of the world), they analyze what distortions are relevant
for explaining capital inflow in both regions. The conclusion favors domestic rather
than international wedges as the main reasons. They find that from the 1950s to
1980s, a lower labor wedge in Latin America reduced the price of labor. A lower
cost of labor attracted capital flows. The declining labor wedge was thus the main
driver of capital inflows, rather than the characteristics of international markets.
Similarly, Otsu (2010b) also concludes that “domestic wedges” are the drivers
even when international capital plays an important role. He studies the Asian
crisis in the 90s under the OBCA framework, focusing on the 1998 recession. With
a similar model to the working paper version of Lama (2011), he concludes that
the efficiency wedge is the most important distortion to capture the dynamics in
Honk Kong, Korea and Thailand. The labor wedge has a lesser importance and
the investment and asset market wedge a very small role. The results are robust
to alternative forms of distortions in the international capital markets, and also to
different preferences. When introducing a capital rather than an investment wedge,
the distortion has a slightly more important role than investment.
Lama (2011) uses an OBCA set up to study recessions and recoveries in se-
lected Latin American countries during the 1990s and early 2000s. The author con-
cludes that the relevant wedges explaining business cycles in the aforesaid emerging
economies are the efficiency wedge and the labor wedge. Even though the bond
wedge has some success in accounting for trade balance movements, its contribution
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for explaining other macroeconomic variables is almost nil. The main conclusions
do not change with alternative specifications, such as different preferences, TFP
affecting the risk premium, TFP following a unit root process and the introduction
of variable capital utilization. The author also provides mappings from models to
wedges in the open-economy benchmark model.
In line with Lama (2011), Graminho (2006) also concludes that the efficiency
and labor wedges are important to explain Brazilian business cycles from 1980 to
2000. The importance of each wedge was evaluated by simulating the model with
each wedge and the outcomes were evaluated with the correlation coefficient and
Theil’s U. After experiencing one of the fastest average growth rates in the world
(GDP grew, on average, at 7,4% per year, from 1950 to 1962 and at 9.0% from
1968 to 1980), Brazilian growth rates became low and the country entered in the
so-called “lost decades”. The author proposes that labor market changes imposed
by the 1988 Constitution with the increase on barriers to competition are the main
root behind it.
Brinca & Costa Filho (2018a) complement Lama (2011) and Graminho (2006)
by using quarterly data, adjusting consumption and investment series as in Brinca
et al. (2016), extending the sample period and focusing on the 2014-2016 depres-
sion. The authors find that the efficiency wedge is the main driver of the episode.
Moreover, there seems to be a negative relation between the efficiency wedge and
the national bank of development (BNDES – Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econoˆmico e Social – in the Portuguese acronym) outlays in the medium run, rais-
ing the hypothesis that the “Brazilian quantitative easing” before 2014 may have
contributed for the drop. If subsidized lending target low return projects, aggregate
productivity might fall. Moreover, a DSGE model with a public development bank
accounts for short-run output movements.
Brazil and the other BRIC economies business cycles are analyzed by Chakraborty
& Otsu (2013). They found out that for Brazil and Russia, investment wedge plays
a key role during the 1990s, while efficiency wedge helps to explain the recovery in
the 2000s (labor wedge is also important, with a smaller role). For China and India,
the relative importance of wedges is the opposite, i.e., efficiency wedges explain the
dynamics during the 1990s, while investment wedges are important for the 2000s,
specially over the second half. Their results are robust to changes in the procedure,
such as capital adjustment costs, hoarding and a small open economy framework.
Hnatkovska & Koehler-Geib (2015) studies why volatility in Paraguay has in-
creased while it has fallen in other Latin American countries, on average. The
authors use VAR models for understanding what was behind that, domestic or in-
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ternational drivers. They find that external shocks are important, specially because
agriculture is a relevant sector in the economy. Moreover, in the BCA with a capital
wedge and separate agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (each one has its own
efficiency wedge) they conjecture that the labor wedge might be influenced by in-
creases in minimum apprentice wages and that capital wedge volatility was mainly
driven by financial constraints on households, rather than firms.
Using a slightly different framework for BCA, with capital utilization as result of
households’ decision, Cavalcanti et al. (2008) analyze business cycles in Argentina
during several economic changes, such as the debt crisis (1972-1982) and the ex-
change rate regime collapse (1991 to 2001), for example. Individually, the efficiency
is the most important distortion, with a very small role for the government wedge
(which is really only a net exports wedge since data on government spending was
not available). By combining wedges, the model with both efficiency and capital
wedge fits better the data. The authors limit their work to BCA.
Simonovska & So¨derling (2008) study the sources of business cycle fluctuations in
Chile [1998-2007]. However important, the efficiency wedge alone is not enough for
explaining outpout movements. The labor and investment play a smaller role. Citing
OCED (2009), they raise the hypothesis that segmentation in Chilean labor market
with respect to age, sex and job tenure may explain the labor and efficiency wedge,
by imposing high entry barriers and preventing firms to adjust inputs properly.
Furthermore, labor market reforms are likely responsible for increasing employment.
Due to the importance of copper to the Chilean economy, they analyze whether their
results change by isolating mining investment. Due to lack of proper data, they use
mining FDI as a proxy of mining investment, by subtracting it from total investment
and adding it to government wedge. The results are similar.
Since the 1950s, Turkey has experienced three military coups and four economics
crises, besides usual recessions and expansion periods. Elgin & C¸ic¸ek (2011) investi-
gates what drives business cycles in the country and finds that the efficiency wedge is
the most important distortion for explaining output short-run dynamics. The labor
wedge plays a secondary role and the remaining wedges do not drive GDP move-
ments in an important way. The authors separate net exports from government
spending, thus they call net exports as “trade wedge”.
Short-run fluctuations during the Korea crisis are addressed by Sarabia (2007).
He uses BCA and finds that the importance of investment wedge and the financial
accelerator model he uses in explaining the episode depends on the parameteriza-
tion. More specifically, on Tobin’s q elasticity. If Tobin’s q elasticity is relatively
small (around 0.5), then the finance premium that creates the financial accelerator
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accounts for a great part of the Korean crisis. Larger values for the elasticity imply
a lower role for the investment wedge. Moreover, the labor wedge seems to play a
secondary role, whereas the efficiency and the government consumption wedge play
small and almost nil roles, respectively.
Gao & Ljungwall (2009) use BCA to analyze Indian and Chinese business cy-
cles. Both economies have been experiencing rapid growth and similar development
strategies: market-oriented reforms and increasing financial and trade integration.
Also, they both began to change their economic structure in the late 1970s, early
1980s. China focused on labor-intensive industries, while India alleviated state in-
terference in its large private sector. The authors find that the efficiency wedge has
an important role to explain business cycles in both countries, whereas the other
wedges play a small role. Technology advances and infrastructure changes may be
behind this result.
He et al. (2009) also analyze Chinese business cycles. Using an OBCA set up,
they also conclude that the efficiency wedge is the most important distortions for
understanding short-run fluctuations in China. Notwithstanding, the other wedges
play a greater role than in Gao & Ljungwall (2009). The bond wedge influence grew
due to the increase in Chinese openness, and also as a consequence of external shocks.
Efficiency wedges may be a consequence of increases in the price of agriculture
products and the labor wedge a result from sticky wages and powerful labor unions.
In Cho & Doblas-Madrid (2013), the authors use BCA to analyze the mecha-
nisms leading output drops in financial crises using a sample of 23 episodes from 13
countries (with different parameters for each country). The evidence points towards
deeper and more investment-driven crises in Asia than in other countries. The au-
thors find that the investment wedge plays a role more important than the labor
wedge. This may emerge due to some idiosyncrasies of Asian financial markets, i.e.,
it seems that Asian system is more relation-based whereas in the Western system is
more market-based. This implies not only that lending criteria, but also that low
return projects may be financed more often in a relation-based environment than in
a marjet-based system. In the long-run this difference may cause growth to be lower
in Asia, because the system lacks “cleaning”, i.e., the removal of inefficient firms.
Asian crises have a higher ratio of nonperforming loans.
Finally, Vasilev (2016) uses BCA with a capital wedge for understanding short-
run fluctuations in Bulgaria. He finds that the efficiency wedge is the most relevant
distortion. The financial crisis hit Bulgaria in 2009 and the country has not recov-
ered since. The efficiency wedge alone would imply a stronger shock and a faster
recovery. This calls for a secondary role of the labor wedge to explain better aggre-
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gate fluctuations in the sample period. The author finds no role for the investment
wedge in Bulgarian macroeconomic fluctuations. They link the efficiency wedge to
the credit and housing dynamics and the labor wedge to employee contributions.
From the comprehensive survey on BCA (and its extensions), the first impres-
sions is that is all about the efficiency wedge. A closer look at the literature finds
may provide a refinement on that. For instance, financial contagion. Episodes with
that nature give more weight to other wedges. For instance, in Bridji (2013), Cho &
Doblas-Madrid (2013), Saijo (2008), Sarabia (2007), Sarabia (2008), Simonovska &
So¨derling (2008), Hirata & Otsu (2011), Lama (2011), the labor wedge explains an
important part of short-run fluctuations. Chadha & Warren (2012) and Chakraborty
& Otsu (2013) are exceptions, where contagion was present, but instead of the labor
wedge capturing movements in data, the investment wedge did.
What explains this pattern? From Kaminsky et al. (2003) we know that finan-
cial contagion usually happens if there are three elements: large capital inflows,
surprise and a leveraged common creditor. Even though detailed economies with
financial markets may be mapped into prototype economies with efficiency wedges,
this combination may give more importance for financial accelerator and thus the
role of investment wedge becomes higher in periods of crises, as in Sarabia (2007).
Economic policy may also a factor that contributes for different relative impor-
tance of wedges. For instance, in emerging markets, major swings in interest rates
and currency crises seem to distort more decisions than just production’s. In the
works of Chakraborty & Otsu (2013), Graminho (2006), Sarabia (2007), Sarabia
(2008), Lama (2011) in which currency crises were present, all of them attribute a
greater role for either the investment or the labor wedge. Only in Otsu (2010b) the
labor wedge plays a small role and the efficiency wedge fully accounts for output
movements.
Major events like the Great Depression or the Great Recession may also call for
more than one important distortion. See Chari et al. (2007a), Bridji (2013), Saijo
(2008), Brinca (2013) for a decisive role of the labor wedge. Brinca et al. (2016)
reveals a prevalence of the efficiency wedge during the Great Recession, but for the
US, the labor wedge is the most important distortion and for Ireland and Spain, it
is the investment wedge. Interestingly though, the government consumption usually
is not as important as the other wedges. With the exception of the 2001 crisis in US
(Section 2.2), Cavalcanti et al. (2008), Kobayashi & Inaba (2006), Gao & Ljungwall
(2009) and Sˇustek (2011), where the government consumption wedge plays a small
role, in the other, its capability of explaining economic fluctuations is either very
small or nil.
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Having presented the BCA literature, the relative role of each wedge changes
from one paper to another and are summarized in tables 2.6 and 2.7. The next
section is dedicated to final remarks.
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Table 2.6: BCA literature findings and the role of each wedge
Paper Method Sample Period* efficiency labor investment / capital government
Ahearne et al. (2006) BCA Ireland 1973-2002 Important Medium Very small/nil Very small/nil
Bridji (2013) BCA France 1986-1939 Important Medium Medium Very small/nil
Cavalcanti (2007) BCA Portugal 1979-2000 Important Medium Very small/nil -
Cavalcanti et al. (2008) BCA Argentina 1992-2006 Important Very small/nil Very small/nil Small
Chadha & Warren (2012) BCA UK 1974-2010 Important Very small/nil Medium Very small/nil
Chakraborty (2009) BCA Japan 1980 to 2000 Important Small Important Very small/nil
Chakraborty & Otsu (2013) BCA BRICs 1990-2009 Important Small Important Very small/nil
Chari et al. (2007a) BCA US 1929-1939; 1959-2004 Important Medium Small Very small/nil
Cho & Doblas-Madrid (2013) BCA 13 countries 23 episodes Important Medium Small Very small/nil
Cunha (2006) BCA Japan 23 episodes Important Very small/nil Important -
Graminho (2006) BCA Brazil 1980-2000 Important Important Very small/nil Very small/nil
Iskrev (2013) BCA Portugal 1998-2012 Important Small Very small/nil Very small/nil
Kersting (2008) BCA UK 1979-1989 Important Important Small Very small/nil
Kobayashi & Inaba (2006) BCA Japan 1981-2003 Medium Important Medium Small
Kolasa (2013) BCA European countries 1995-2011 Important Medium Small Very small/nil
Gao & Ljungwall (2009) BCA China and India 1978-2006 Important Small Small Small
Lo´pez & Garc´ıa (2014) BCA Spain 1976-2012 Medium Important Very small/nil Very small/nil
Orsi & Turino (2014) BCA Italy 1982-2008 Important Medium Very small/nil Very small/nil
Saijo (2008) BCA Japan 1921-1936 Important Medium Medium Very small/nil
Sarabia (2007) BCA Korea 1982-2005 Small Medium Important Very small/nil
Sarabia (2008) BCA Mexico 1987-2006 Important Medium Small Very small/nil
Simonovska & So¨derling (2008) BCA Chile 1998-2007 Important Medium Medium Very small/nil
Brinca et al. (2016) BCA OECD countries 2008-2015 Important Medium Medium Very small/nil
BCA: Business Cycle Accounting, MBCA: Monetary Business Cycle Accounting, IBCA: International Business Cycle Accounting,
OBCA: Open-Economy Business Cycle Accounting
*If periods change due do different data availability, longest data sample is considered.
**The author does not implement BCA decomposition as in CKM, hence one cannot infer what is the relative role for each wedge.
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Table 2.7: BCA literature findings: the role of each wedge
Paper Method Sample Period* efficiency labor investment/ government bond asset monetary international International
capital policy price trade
Hirata & Otsu (2011) IBCA Japan, Korea and Taiwan 1980-2009 Important Medium Very small/nil Very small/nil - - - Small Small
Otsu (2010a) IBCA Japan and US 1980-2008 Important Important Medium Very small/nil - - - Medium Medium
Brinca (2013) MBCA Sweden 1982-2010 Important Important Small Very small/nil - Small Important - -
Sˇustek (2011) MBCA US 1958-2004 Important Very small/nil Small Small - Important Important - -
He et al. (2009) OBCA China 1978-2006 Important Medium Medium Very small/nil Medium - - - -
Hevia (2014) OBCA Mexico, Canada and Korea 1976-2011 Important Medium Small Very small/nil Medium - - - -
Lama (2011) OBCA Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru 1990-2006 Important Important Very small/nil - Very small/nil - - - -
Otsu (2010b) OBCA Hong Kong, Korea and Thailand 1960-2003 Important Small Very small/nil Very small/nil Very small/nil - - - -
Brinca (2014) BCA 23 OECD countries 1970-2011 Important Medium Very small/nil Very small/nil - - - - -
Hnatkovska & Koehler-Geib (2015) BCA Paraguay 1991-2010 ** ** ** ** - - - - -
Ohanian et al. (2015) IBCA*** Latin America and East Asia 1950-2006 Very small/nil Important Small - - - - Medium*** -
Brinca & Costa Filho (2018b) BCA Mexico 1991-2015 Important Medium Medium Very small/nil - - - - -
Elgin & C¸ic¸ek (2011) BCA Turkey 1968-2009 Important Medium Very small/nil Very small/nil - - - - -
Vasilev (2016) BCA Bulgaria 1999-2014 Important Medium Very small/nil - - - - - -
Gerth & Otsu (2016) BCA 29 European countries 2008-2014 Important Small Small Very small/nil - - - - -
Brinca & Costa Filho (2018a) BCA Brazil 1996-2016 Important Medium Medium Very small/nil - - - - -
Meza (2008) BCA Mexico 1994-2000 Important Medium Small Small - - - - -
BCA: Business Cycle Accounting, MBCA: Monetary Business Cycle Accounting, IBCA: International Business Cycle Accounting,
OBCA: Open-Economy Business Cycle Accounting
*If periods change due do different data availability, longest data sample is considered.
**The author does not implement BCA decomposition as in CKM, hence one cannot infer what is the relative role for each wedge.
***The international price wedge is not exactly the same as the international capital wedge, given the different framework for IBCA
and a multi-country IBCA developed in Ohanian et al. (2015).
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2.6 Final remarks
What are the drivers of business cycles? A whole research area has devoted much
effort for providing a set of evidence for this question. Each episode, for each country
has its own characteristics, so there is no general model to account for short run
fluctuation. Due to the great supply of detailed DSGE models, it is difficult to
narrow the search for the “right” model.
The business cycle accounting method provides an important tool for business
cycle modeling. It relies on two dimensions. First, the accounting dimension. By
defining a perfectly competitive prototype model with wedges, the relative contribu-
tion of each wedge can be assessed. After identifying the drivers of macroeconomic
movements, the second dimension, the equivalence theorems – mappings of frictions
into classes of detailed economies – helps to guide further research on business cycle
fluctuations.
BCA was extended along several dimensions, by introducing the interaction be-
tween nominal and real variables (monetary business cycle accounting), foreign bor-
rowing within a small open economy set up (open-economy business cycle account-
ing) and the relationship between countries (international business cycle account-
ing). All extensions rely on the same reasoning, a prototype model with distortions.
Although it seems be an important method for guidance, it has limitations. First,
the prototype economy might be wrong. If the framework is wrong this influences
the account of wedges and the conclusions. Moreover, the need for distortions arise
only because the neoclassical growth model does not account for data variation.
But what if data is wrong? This is the second branch of criticism. What if by not
accounting properly for intangible capital or the shadow economy, for instance, we
call for distortions where there is only mismeasurement?
In this paper, the application of BCA focused on three US recessions (1973,
1990 and 2001). Even though the efficiency wedge was the main driver of all of
them, it was more important during the first oil shock than in the other crises. An
interesting result is that the government consumption wedge played a secondary
role for explaining the recession after the technology bubble burst in the US stock
exchange.
Not only this work provides BCA exercises, but also contributes to the literature
by surveying common findings from several works using BCA and its extensions.
This provides a reasonable sample for the next step: broader conclusions and pat-
tern identification. Generally, hours of work are closely related to the labor wedge.
Investment wedges may not only be useful for the path of aggregate investment, but
also, in an open-economy set up, for helping to explain the country risk spreads.
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Therefore, depending on the variables of interest, detailed models equivalent to the
prototype economy with an efficiency wedge may be not enough.
By this point, it is clear that the efficiency wedge plays a crucial role in explaining
output fluctuations. This conclusion is not a surprise, otherwise RBC models would
not become so popular. But what explains differences in the papers that use BCA?
There are two factors. First, the mappings. Perhaps the difference is not in which
wedge drives short run macroeconomic movements, but actually in what explains
that wedge (e.g. is it a credit friction or firms’ heterogeneity?). Second, the relative
importance of other wedges. What motivates the second factor?
In this paper a few broad conclusions were drawn. First, episodes of contagion
may be one motivation for other wedges driving business cycles. Second, economic
policy, specially in emerging markets. Finally, major events, such as the Great
Depression and the 2008 financial crisis.
The business cycle theory has evolved and created reasonable criteria for helping
researchers to develop detailed DSGE models. Further work may be done either
by expanding BCA in other dimensions rather than the three presented in this
paper. In this paper, some patterns were found, specially during financial crises.
Data availability and new papers will eventually provide new findings and broader
conclusions may be drawn. Nevertheless, it is already a good starting point for
short-run economic modeling.
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Chapter 3
Output falls and the international
transmission of crises
One knows a financial crisis when it happens.
Charles Kndleberger.1
3.1 Introduction
In the past 800 years we have been dealing with several financial crises2. The
problem has grown and the frequency of financial crises has increased since the end
of Bretton Woods, specially since the 1990s3. Economic recessions usually take four
quarters, but recoveries from crises associated with a credit boom and bust are worse
(Claessens et al., 2009). The unemployment rate may stay above its pre-crisis level
for over a decade (Reinhart et al., 2010).
The so-called Great Recession emerged from the collapse in the US housing
markets and hit not only the US economy, but several economies around the world
(Claessens et al., 2009; Rose & Spiegel, 2012). The largest financial crisis since the
1930s destabilized important macroeconomic variables both for the short and the
long-run (Reinhart & Reinhart, 2010).
How was the crisis transmitted? Integration in goods and services markets as
well as financial markets may provide the answer. Furthermore, does the growing
integration affects not only production decisions, but also how crisis are transmitted?
In order to address this issue quantitatively, we approach Mexican data. From Figure
3.1 in Section 3.2 we have some evidence of two major downturns in the country:
1Kindleberger & O’Keefe (2001).
2See Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) and Kindleberger & O’Keefe (2001) for a vast documentation of
financial crises.
3See Bordo et al. (2001) and Eichengreen (2002)
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the so-called “Tequila crisis” in 1995 (top graph) and the Great Recession (bottom
graph). The recovery in Mexico after the 2008 crisis was weak, with GDP and
industrial production achieving pre-crisis levels only in 2011 (Ibarra, 2015).
Both episodes differ in severity and duration, but may provide a rich sample
for answering the question about the transmission. First, what are the drivers of
both crises? An useful way is to use the business cycle accounting (henceforth BCA).
Following Chari et al. (2007a) and Brinca et al. (2016), the relevant distortions in the
neoclassical growth model are estimated and analyzed (the accounting procedure).
The method relies on two pillars: accounting and equivalences (Brinca et al., 2016).
This paper provides contributions on both.
First, the BCA decomposition favors the efficiency wedge (i.e., distortion in
the production decisions) as the most relevant wedge for explaining per worker
output movements in Mexico in both crises. The secondary and tertiary roles are
different, though. For the 1995 episode, the investment wedge (the distortion in the
intertemporal decision) plays the secondary part, whereas in the Great recession,
it was the labor wedge (the distortion in the labor decision), but with both the
investment and the government consumption wedge (the distortion on the resource
constraint) playing close tertiary roles.
What lies behind the relative importance of each wedge? Furthermore, what
lies behind the international transmission of the crisis to domestic production in
Mexico? After finding that the efficiency wedge is the main driver of GDP, a DSGE
model is build to understand the crisis (the equivalence procedure). Given that
Mexico is an open-economy and the fact that the government consumption wedge
is not as important as the other wedges to understand the crisis, there may be an
international channel “hidden” in the efficiency wedge, since imported intermediate
goods play an important role in final goods production in Mexico. A small-open
economy model augmented with imports in the production function was estimated
to analyze the Great Recession. The model seems to capture the essence of the
international link of the crisis, the directly link to production decisions, rather than
via the balance-of-payments dynamics. The model is able to replicate observed
movements in data for both crises (1995 and 2008).
This chapter is organized as follows. Besides this introduction, the next section
presents a literature review of BCA and the prototype model used for identifying
relevant wedges driving Mexican business cycles. Section 3.3 presents the business
cycle accounting and the detailed economy used to understand the Mexican Great
Recession. The last section is dedicated to final remarks and conclusions.
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3.2 International crises and business cycles: ac-
counting and modeling
From the prototype economy presented in Chapter 2 we can estimate each of the
four wedges using per worker data on output, investment, hours of work, government
consumption and net exports. Following Brinca et al. (2016), original variables were
adjusted. For instance, since decisions on the consumption of durable goods look
like investment decisions, they were subtracted from aggregate consumption and
added to aggregate investment4.
The Mexican case is also addressed by Sarabia (2008) and Meza (2008). In both
papers the efficiency is the most important, whereas in the latter it divides the
protagonism with the labor wedge. In Sarabia (2008), even though for the 1995
episode the role of the investment wedge is higher than for the 2001 recession, it still
plays a minor role. The labor wedge is more important for explaining the 1995 crisis
than the 2001 recession. For Meza (2008), the main goal is to understand to role of
fiscal policy. Using an adjusted version of BCA (adding net exports to investment,
rather than to government consumption), he finds that policy changes, specially via
tax increases are important quantitatively. This paper complements the existing
business cycle accounting literature for Mexico by i) adjusting consumption and
investment quarterly data, ii) extending the sample period and iii) focusing on the
2008 financial crisis recovery.
Figure 3.1 presents data for two periods: the 1995 crisis and the Great Recession
in Mexico. In the so called “Tequila Crisis” output fell more than in the Great
Recession, achieving a 10.1% accumulated fall in the third quarter of 1995 when
compared with the pre-crisis peak (1995Q1), whereas in the latter episode the bot-
tom was a 5.9% accumulated fall in the first quarter of 2009, relative to the pre-crisis
peak in the second quarter of 2008. The velocity of the recovery also differed. In
the 1995 episode, pre-crisis peak level was restored after 11 quarters, whereas after
the fall in 2008, output took 15 quarters to achieve its pre-crisis level.
It is not only the dynamics of output that differed from one episode to another.
In the 1995 episode, investment contracted more than 36% in the third quarter of
1995, while in the Great Recession the bottom was achieved with a 19.3% fall.
The dynamics of government consumption plus net exports also differed between
episodes. In the “Tequila crisis”, it rose after the shock, accumulating an almost
4Data from OECD used in Brinca et al. (2016). Quarterly tax data and population data was
obtained by linear interpolation from annual data. To extend durables goods time series to match
other macro variables, a linear regression of durables goods on both output and investment was
used and its intersection changed to smooth the “transition” from observed to estimated data
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Figure 3.1: Macroeconomic variables in the 1995 and 2008 crises
Notes: For the 1995 crisis (top graph), 1991Q1=100. For the 2008 crisis (bottom
graph), 2008Q2=100.
68% increase in the third quarter of 1995. During the Great Recession, however,
the behavior was different. The initial response was a fall, rather than an increase.
After the fall, it started to augment, but its movements were more erratic than in
the 1995 crisis.
Finally, in both crises hours of work presented lower volatility when compared
with other variables. But as the previous cases, the dynamics differed between
episodes. For the 1995 crisis, it felt 1.7% but it as recevored after four quarters. In
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the 2008 crisis, 25 quarters after the fall and it was still below pre-crisis level.
The prescriptions of the neoclassical growth were confronted with the presented
data and the path of the estimated wedges is shown in Figure 3.2. The efficiency
wedge felt more during the “Tequila crisis” than in the Great Recession, but after
the fall it took more time to achieve its pre-crisis level in the latter episode. For the
investment wedge, the relative recovery is inverse, i.e., it took more time after the
“Tequila Crisis” to increase than after the Great Recession. The labor wedge felt in
an equivalent way in both episodes. The behavior of the government consumption
wedge follows the slower-recovery characteristic of the Great Recession seen in both
output data and efficiency wedge.
Figure 3.2: Estimated HP-filtered wedges for the Mexican economy
After measuring/estimating the distortions, it is possible to simulate variables
paths to see which wedge helps to explain data movements. Following Chari et al.
(2007a), the marginal effect of each wedge is obtained by keeping all other wedges
fixed, but the one we are interested in, e.g. if we want to see the contribution of
the efficiency wedge, we let it to fluctuate, while the others (labor, investment and
government) are held fixed. Then we can see how much of the data behavior the
model with only one distortion can account for. The procedure works letting two or
three wedges varying throughout time as well.
The prototype economy was simulated with only one wedge (all other remained
constant) and with only one wedge off (only one wedge remaining constant) and
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the output path for each simulation for both crises (1995 and 2008) are presented
in figures 3.3 and 3.4. Table 3.1 presents four statistics for the BCA simulations:
success ratio, linear correlation, root mean-square error (RMSE) and a φ statistic
following Brinca et al. (2016), defined in Chapter 2.
The efficiency wedge alone has the best performance amongst one wedge economies
for both episodes. However, this is not true for the full sample. For instance, it ac-
counts for only 18% of whole output movements, whereas it explains 85% of output
movements in the 1995 crisis and 44.6% during the Great Recession. After the
“Tequila crisis”, the distortion in the production decisions would imply a lower out-
put level (see Figure 3.3) and a faster recovery in the Great Recession compared to
actual data, calling for a (secondary) role of other wedges (see Figure 3.4).
The investment wedge plays a secondary for explaining output variations. It
accounts for 22% in the whole sample, 10% in the 1995 crisis and 17% during the
Great Recession. Figure 3.3 shows that the model without the investment wedge
implies a lower fall and a higher output after the 1995 crisis. The labor wedge
explains less than 4% of output fluctuations in the whole sample, 2% in the “Tequila
crisis” and 21.7% in the 2008 crisis.
Figure 3.3: Simulated economies during the 1995 crisis
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Table 3.1: BCA decomposition statistics
Statistic Efficiency Labor Investment Government
One wedge economies - full sample
Success Ratio 0.779 0.474 0.579 0.337
Correlation 0.839 0.295 -0.180 -0.480
RMSE 0.016 0.046 0.052 0.032
φyi 0.179 0.036 0.222 0.564
One wedge off economies - full sample
Success Ratio 0.558 0.726 0.653 0.916
Correlation 0.114 0.383 0.158 0.983
RMSE 0.030 0.042 0.198 0.009
1− φyi 0.821 0.964 0.778 0.436
One wedge economies - 1995 crisis
Success Ratio 0.923 0.615 0.538 0.154
Correlation 0.960 0.359 0.234 -0.934
RMSE 0.015 0.099 0.042 0.083
φyi 0.852 0.019 0.103 0.027
One wedge off economies - 1995 crisis
Success Ratio 0.538 0.692 0.692 0.923
Correlation 0.498 0.686 0.650 0.998
RMSE 0.075 0.041 0.219 0.015
1− φyi 0.148 0.981 0.897 0.973
One wedge economies - Great Recession
Success Ratio 0.750 0.536 0.536 0.464
Correlation 0.899 0.308 -0.332 -0.022
RMSE 0.017 0.025 0.028 0.028
φyi 0.446 0.217 0.170 0.167
One wedge off economies - Great Recession
Success Ratio 0.571 0.750 0.571 0.857
Correlation -0.159 0.784 0.179 0.981
RMSE 0.023 0.012 0.112 0.007
1− φyi 0.554 0.783 0.830 0.833
Success ratio: relative frequency when simulated and observed data had the same
sign; Linear correlations between simulated and observed data; RMSE: root of the
mean-square error; φ-statistic following Brinca et al. (2016).
Finally, the government consumption wedge has some contradictory results.
Even tough it is the main driver of output movements in the full sample, accounting
for 56.4% of output movements, its contribution falls to less than 3% in the 1995
and to 16.7% in the Great Recession. The simulated output paths presented in
Figure 3.4 for the economies with only the government consumption wedge are in
line with the simulation from a sudden stop in Chari et al. (2005). In both cases,
output would rise if the driver was only that wedge, whereas observed data follows
a different path. Furthermore, output from the models with only this wedge have
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negative correlations with data.
Figure 3.4: Simulated economies during the 2008 crisis
The poor performance for the models with only a government consumption raises
a question. Given the fact the 1995 is an exchange rate crisis and the 2008 is an
international crisis, should not they be transmitted via the balance of payments,
assigning a greater role for the government consumption wedge due to an increase
in net exports after exchange rate depreciations?
In order to answer that one should be able to match the importance of the
efficiency wedge with a hidden international transmission link. Let us begin by ac-
counting for the importance of intermediate goods in Mexican GDP. Using interme-
diate goods data from WITS-World Bank and GDP data from the World Economic
Outlook Database (April 2016), we can see in Figure 3.5 the share for Mexico. For
a matter of comparison, the same proportion for the US is shown.
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Figure 3.5: Intermediate goods imports - share of GDP
Total imports of intermediate goods not only rose since the 1990s (as one could
expect since output trend growth is positive since then), but it has increased faster
than GDP. The share of GDP destined to foreign intermediate goods is almost twice
the level it was in 1995. Moreover, the Mexican economy was hit by at least two
shocks during the Great Recession: exports falling due to a lower demand from the
US and a risk aversion movement depreciating the exchange rate (Sidaoui et al.,
2010).
Figure 3.6 presents two series: log-detrended per capita output (using the HP-
filter in Hodrick & Prescott (1997)) and deviations from the purchase power parity
equilibrium for the real exchange rate5. The coefficient of linear correlation for both
series is negative -0.61. Usually, output deviations and real exchange rate deviations
move to opposite directions, simultaneously.
With all that in mind, the next section presents a model using imported-goods
in the production function to understand the crisis in Mexico6.
5In the long run the real exchange rate should be equals to 1 according to the purchase power
parity theory. The sample mean is 0.99.
6Kim (2014) also introduces imported intermediate goods in the production function. However,
his paper focuses on the impact of tariff changes during the Korean crisis, rather than the influence
of the real exchange rate.
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Figure 3.6: HP-filtered per capita output vs Real exchange rate changes
Note: a rise in the exchange rate means a depreciation.
3.2.1 Detailed economy
We introduce imported intermediate inputs in the final goods production in Schmitt-
Grohe´ & Uribe (2003) small open-economy debt-elastic interest rate model. House-
holds behave in a rational way, maximizing its present-valued expected lifetime
utility:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, lt)
where ct stands for consumption, lt for hours of work and U(ct, lt) is the instan-
taneous utility. As is usual in this kind of model, households have a positive but
decreasing marginal utility of consumption and an increasing marginal disutility of
labor. The domestic agents can use their own resources as well as foreign capital.
The foreign debt (dt) dynamics is given by:
dt = (1 + rt−1)dt−1 − yt + ct + xt + Λ(kt+1) + etmt
where Λ(kt+1) =
φ
2
(kt+1 − kt)2 represents capital adjustment costs. Current foreign
debt (dt) is a function of the last period’s stock of debt and the one-period interest
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rate (rt), net from savings made for paying part of the debt (i.e., aggregate income –
yt – less the amount spent in consumption – ct – and investment – xt – and the last
contemplating capital accumulation costs), mt stands for net imported intermediate
goods and et is the real exchange rate.
The interest rate is a function of the equilibrium interest rate and the country’s
foreign indebtedness level, as follows:
rt = r + ψ(e
dt−d − 1).
The production technology has the standard Cobb-Douglas formulation7:
yt = m
µ
t (k
α
t l
1−α
t )
1−µ.
The real exchange rate is assumed to be exogenous, following an AR(1) process:
ln et = ρe ln et−1 + et .
The capital accumulation is given by the current stock of capital net of depreci-
ation plus the flow of investments:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xt.
Under the presented assumptions, the optimization problem is given by:
max
ct,lt,dt,kt+1
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, lt)
subject to the debt dynamics, the production function and the capital accumulation
law of motion, given the exogenous movements of TFP.
One more restriction should be imposed to assure a Non-Ponzi dynamics of the
system. The transversality condition is given by:
lim
j→∞
Et
dt+j∏j
s(1 + rs)
≤ 0
which implies that the present value of the debt should be less or equal to zero, i.e.,
no remaining debt in the limit.
The first order conditions are:
λt = βEtλt+1(1 + rt), (3.1)
7Which respects the Inada conditions. See Kim (2014).
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λt = Uct , (3.2)
−Ult
Uct
= (1− α)(1− µ)yt
lt
, (3.3)
λt(1 + φ(kt+1 − kt)) = βEtλt+1(φ(kt+2 − kt+1) + 1− δ + (1− µ)αyt+1
kt+1
), (3.4)
∂L
∂mt
= 0⇔ µyt
mt
= et, (3.5)
where ∂U(ct, lt)/∂ct = Uct and ∂U(ct, lt)/∂lt = Ult and λt represents the Lagrange
muliplier. The definition of trade balance over GDP (tbyt) closes the model:
yt − ct − xt − g(kt+1)− etmt = (1 + rt−1)dt−1 − dt,
yt − ct − xt − g(kt+1)− etmt = tbt,
1− ct
yt
− xt
yt
− g(kt+1)
yt
− etmt
yt
= tbyt.
(3.6)
3.2.2 Equivalences and quantitative analysis
In order to work with the DSGE model, the preferences regarding consumption and
leisure should be defined. Two natural candidates arise: the utility function used
in BCA exercises (BCA preferences) and the one used in Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe
(2003) (SGU preferences).
BCA preferences
Let us assume that households combine consumption and leisure in an additive
log-form. If this is the case, one could express household’s preferences as follows:
U(ct, lt) = ln ct + ω ln(1− lt)
Thus equations (6) and (7) become, respectively:
λt =
1
ct
and
ωct
1− lt = (1− α)(1− µ)
yt
lt
Under these preferences an equivalence is proposed.
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Proposition 1. Considerer the prototype economy previously described, with U(ct, lt) =
ln ct +ω ln(1− lt), At = mµt (kαt l1−αt )−µ, (1 + τx,t) = (1 + φ(kt+1− kt)), (1 + τx,t+1) =
1 + (1 +φ(kt+2− kt+1))/(1− δ), (1− τl,t) = 0 and gt = (1 + rt−1)dt−1− dt + φ2 (kt+1−
kt)
2 + etmt − a2( xt(s
t)
kt(st−1) − b)2. The equilibrium allocations in the detailed economy
match equilibrium allocations in the prototype economy.
Proof. The efficiency wedge mapping comes from equating both production func-
tions: Atk
α
t l
1−α
t = m
µ
t (k
α
t l
1−α
t )
1−µ ⇐⇒ At = mµt (kαt l1−αt )−µ. The labor wedge
distorts the intratemporal decision. In the detailed economy, there is no such dis-
tortion in equation (3.7), thus (1 − τl,t) = 0. From equation (3.6) we have the
marginal utility of consumption. The right hand side of equation (3.4) – in the
prototype economy – presents the marginal utility of consumption, which is equal
to the Langrange multiplier, times the investment wedge. By equating the left
hand side of equation (3.8) to the left hand side of equation (3.3) we have see that
(1 + τx,t) = (1 + φ(kt+1 − kt)). Moreover, making both right hand sides equal yields
βEt[uc,t+1(At+1Fkt + (1 − δ)(1 + τx,t+1))] = βEtλt+1(φ(kt+2 − kt+1) + 1 − δ + (1 −
µ)α yt+1
kt+1
) ⇐⇒ (1 + τx,t+1) = 1 + (1 + φ(kt+2 − kt+1))/(1 − δ). The government
consumption wedge arises from the resource constrain, by isolating output, invest-
ment and consumption (and the different functional form for adjustment costs):
gt = (1 + rt−1)dt−1 − dt + φ2 (kt+1 − kt)2 + etmt − a2( xt(s
t)
kt(st−1) − b)2.
Proposition 1 states that the efficiency wedge (the distortion in production de-
cisions) depend, among other things, on net imports. Due to the participation
of imports in Mexican production, an increase in imports would soar GDP. On
the other hand, if imports decrease, one should expect GDP to fall. Furthermore,
net imports would decrease if real exchange rate depreciates under Marshall-Lerner
conditions. If imports are that important to Mexico, one should see a negative
correlation between real exchange rate depreciation and short-run output growth.
It is opportune to do also the equivalence with an extension of business cycle
accounting that departs from an open-economy version of the prototype model.
Proposition 2. Considerer the open-economy prototype model of Otsu (2010b),
with U(ct, lt) = ln ct + ω ln(1 − lt), g(kt+1) = Θ(xtkt ), Φ(.) = 0, At = m
µ
t (k
α
t l
1−α
t )
−µ,
(1 + τx,t) = ((1 + γn)(1 + γ))
−1, (1 + τx,t+1) = 1 + g(kt+1) − yt+1kt+1αµ, (1 − τl,t) = 0,
gt = etmt and (1+τ
D
t ) =
1+rt−1
R
. The equilibrium allocations in the detailed economy
match equilibrium allocations in the prototype economy.
Proof. The proof of the mappings for the efficiency wedge, the labor wedge and the
marginal marginal utility of consumption are the same as in the proposition 1. The
investment wedge at t and t + 1 comes from comparing both Euler equations. Let
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us assume that capital adjustment costs are the same in both models, i.e. Θt(
xt
kt
) =
φ
2
(kt+1 − kt)2 and that there is no cost of adjusting debt. Thus the government
consumption wedge arises from the resource constrain: gt = etmt and the foreign
debt wedge comes from comparing households’ budget constraint in Otsu (2010b)
with the resource constraint in the model of this paper.
Under BCA preferences the model has different performances when comparing
the outcomes with data for both the 1995 and the 2008 crises. For the former the
initial fall is accounted for the model, whereas the recovery prescribed by would be
faster and stronger than the one observed in data. The same pattern happens when
considering only the 2008 crisis. However, the performance is even poorer, since the
model would prescribe a lesser fall and a stronger recovery. Figure 3.7 presents the
comparisons.
Figure 3.7: Output: data vs model with BCA preferences
Notes: The outcome of a log-linearized model and the HP-filtered output data.
Even though the main driver of the two episodes is the efficiency wedge, the
decomposition also favored the investment wedge, with a less important role in
both fluctuations. The wedge may arise from difference preferences and the natural
candidate is the utility function from Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003)8.
SGU preferences
Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003) use a different functional form:
U(ct, lt) =
[ct − ω−1lωt ]1−γ − 1
1− γ
Thus equations (3.6) and (3.7) become, respectively:
8See appendix B for the issue of different preferences resulting in a investment wedge.
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λt = [ct − ω−1lωt ]−γ
and
(1− α)(1− µ)yt = lωt
In order to understand the transmission of the Mexican Great Recession, the
model was simulated using Dynare with both BCA and SGU preferences. The
model under SGU preferences performs better than the one with BCA preferences.
From the business cycle accounting we already knew that, even favoring the
efficiency wedge as the main driver of the slow recovery after the Tequila crisis and
Great Recession, in both episodes the investment wedge plays a greater role than in
the whole sample. In the small open-economy model used in this paper, both the
labor and investment wedge arise from different preferences.
To assess the effects of the real exchange rate shocks on the output dynamics
for the “Tequila crisis”, the outcomes of the DSGE model (log-linearized) were
confronted with observed data and presented in Figure 3.89.
Figure 3.8: Output: data vs model with SGU preferences
Notes: The outcome of a log-linearized model and the HP-filtered output data.
9See Table 5.1 in Appendix B for the parameterization
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We can see from Figure 3.8 that the model with SGU preferences has a good
performance, in both crises. The statistics are presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Model evaluation: BCA vs SGU preferences
Statistic BCA preferences SG preferences
1995 crisis
Success Ratio 0.600 0.150
Correlation 0.407 0.891
RMSE 0.080 0.049
2008 crisis
Success Ratio 0.485 0.150
Correlation -0.02 0.793
RMSE 0.042 0.019
Success ratio: relative frequency when simulated and observed data had the same
sign; Linear correlations between simulated and observed data; RMSE: root of the
mean-square error.
The model is able to capture both the intensity of output fall in the episode
and the recovery afterwards. This finds complement the existing literature on the
1995 crisis that attribute to banking fragilities, changes in world capital movements,
economic policy and foreign interest rates to the roots of the crisis (Kaminsky et al.,
2003; Calvo & Mendoza, 1996) by adding in another driver of output fall and recov-
ery, the imports.
The model also accounts for the output dynamics during the Great Recession.
After a initial shock output fell, and differently from the experience of the 1990s,
the recovery was slow. Despite for a brief decoupling period, the model mimics
these features of data. The exchange rate depreciation following the crisis decrease
imports, what in the aforesaid model diminishes production. The real exchange rate
path after 2008 may help to explain the Great Recession in Mexico.
3.3 Final remarks
The largest financial crisis since the Great Depression imposed a hard reality on
both developed and emerging market economies. Arising from problems within the
US housing market and transmitted via complex financial instruments networks
throughout financial markets around the world, its recovery was anything but fast.
Mexico is one example of it.
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When comparing with the “Tequila” crisis, some variables felt more after 2008
than after 1995 and the post-crisis recovery was slower. The business cycle ac-
counting method helps us to understand the mechanisms of the observed dynamics.
By confronting real data with the outcomes from a neoclassical growth model, one
could estimate distortions in agents’ optimal decisions driving business cycles. In
the case of the Mexican Great Recession, the efficiency wedge explains most of the
output variation. However, the model with only the efficiency wedge prescribes a
faster recovery than the one observed in data. Therefore, other distortions are also
important.
Due to a rising importance of foreign intermediate goods in final goods pro-
duction in Mexico, a small-open economy model was extended to encompass this
feature. It is possible to map the detailed economy into the prototype economy with
wedges for both traditional and open-economy BCA.
Using BCA preferences the open-economy model has a poor performance. The
models with SGU preferences was able to account for output fall and recovery in the
1995 and 2008 crisis. This reveals a “hidden” international link that can be mapped
into an efficiency, rather than via the government consumption wedge.
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Chapter 4
Economic depression in Brazil:
the 2014-2016 fall
There are repeated periods during which real GDP falls, the most dramatic instance
being the early 1930s. Such periods are called recessions if they are mild and
depressions if they are more severe.
Gregory N. Mankiw.1
4.1 Introduction
Dealing with financial crises is not a new feature of capitalist economies. Actually,
this is a problem of more than eight centuries2. Nevertheless, since the Great De-
pression, no other episode was as strong as the 2008 financial crisis3. The crisis hit
the world economy emerging from problems in the US housing market, spreading to
the rest of the world throughout a complex derivatives network and the economic
policies responding to the fall (Brunnermeier, 2009). In Brazil, differently from the
experience of the developed countries, it was just a contraction of two quarters, in
2009.
After the fall, the economy bounced back and 2010 was prosperous. However,
since 2011, growth rates trended downwards. Specially after 2014, when its close-
to-zero growth marked a period of a severe recession or, as it is called in this paper,
a depression.
The aim of this paper is to understand the drivers of the Brazilian 2014-2016 de-
pression. To this end, this paper is organized as follows. The next section addresses
1Mankiw (2010).
2Reinhart et al. (2010).
3Claessens et al. (2009).
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Brazilian business cycles. Since the 1980s the country seems to have lost the ability
to have sustainable growth rate that suits its emerging market status. One reason
is the dynamics of total factor productivity, also explored in next section. Having
experienced nine recessions since the 1980s, the country faces a complicated long
run dilemma. The short run is no less challenging.
The eighth period of expansion since 1981 was ended by the 2014-2016 depression.
At the same time, the world registered more or less steady growth rates and one
could wonder whether the deceleration was a byproduct of a global fall or if it was
the consequence of domestic policies. Section 4.3 deals with that issue. The evidence
points towards a domestic cause after all.
Section 4.4 analyzes the drivers of the depression using BCA. The decomposition
exercises indicate a prominent role for the efficiency wedge during the depression.
The importance of earmarked credit in Brazil leads us to look further on credit
markets and the relationship between the efficiency wedge and the loans of the
federal public development bank. As a result, an increase in the development bank
outlays has a positive impact on the efficiency wedge in the short run. However,
this is offsetted by a negative impact a few quarters after the shock.
The intuition is the following. At first, by accumulating capital in a publicly-
financed sector, total production may rise even more than accumulation of factors
would prescribed (generating an efficiency wedge). However, in the second period,
if the credit was allocated to projects with low returns, aggregate productivity de-
creases.
A dynamic general equilibrium model with credit market frictions and a public
bank is able to mimic output dynamics and help us to understand the episode. By
combining the results, we conclude that the depression is a combination of lagged
negative impacts of public lending, which were cut and generated a negative short-
run impact. Furthermore, household and firms’ debt made the recovery slower than
past episodes.
Finally, the last section is destined to further remarks and conclusions.
4.2 Brazil in the long and the short run
The Brazilian economy has experienced different growth patterns, especially since
the 1980s. After two-digit growth rates of GDP in the seventies, not only the
economy was hit by the second oil shock and the increase of interest rates in the US,
but also it seems to have lost its capability to sustain high growth for more than a
few periods.
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Figure 4.1: GDP Growth Rate (%)
Note: data from IBGE.
After the second oil, interest rates in US rose, leading to a capital outflow. The
deterioration of the balance of payments (which showed a large current account
deficit) led to a recession and marked the beginning of a new period of economic
growth, at lower rates (see Figure 4.1).
The 1980s Brazil’s “lost decade” was a combination of high (leading to hyper) in-
flation, low development and lower growth. The Latin America debt crisis triggered
by the 1982 Mexican default managed to make the situation even worse. Several
attempts to stabilize the economy were made, but only in 1994, with “The Real
Plan”, Brazil overcome hyperinflation. However, stabilization alone was not enough
to bring back the 1970s growth rates.
According to the business cycle dating committee (CODACE in the Portuguese
acronym), Brazil has experienced nine recessions since the 1980s4. The duration
of each recession has varied from 2 to 11 quarters. The longest recessions were
experience within i) a problematic period combining the first direct elections after
the dictatorship with unsuccessful stabilizing plans and a presidential impeachment
(1989Q3-1992Q1) and ii) a combination of GDP deceleration and also a presiden-
tial impeachment (2014Q2-2016Q4). This latter recession was also the most severe
(GDP felt from the peak to the through 8.6%), whereas the second stronger fall of
real GDP (-7.7% from the peak to the through) occurred after the second oil shock
(1981Q1-1983Q1). Table 4.1 presents CODACE dated recessions.
4CODACE (2017).
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Table 4.1: Brazilian Recessions
Period Duration Accumulated Annualized average
(in quarters) growth* quarterly growth
1981Q1-1983Q1 9 -8.5% -3.9%
1987Q1-1988Q4 6 -4.2% -2.8%
1989Q3-1992Q1 11 -7.7% -2.9%
1995Q2-1995Q3 2 -2.8% -5.6%
1998Q1-1999Q1 5 -1.5% -1.2%
2001Q2-2001Q4 3 -0.9% -1.2%
2003Q1-2003Q2 2 -1.6% -3.1%
2008Q4-2009Q1 2 -5.5% -10.8%
2014Q2-2016Q4 11 -8.6% -3.2%
Notes: *Peak to through; Source: CODACE; Author’s elaboration.
In the same period (1980-2017), there were eight periods of expansions, each
varying from 2 to 20 quarters. The 1983Q2-1987Q2 registered the higher accumu-
lated growth, 30%, from through to peak. After a brief 2003Q1-2003Q2 recession
(due to the tight monetary and fiscal policy to contain inflation increase and ex-
change rate depreciation after the 2002 election), Brazil grew for 21 consecutively
quarters. The recession after the 2008 financial crisis was brief. However, the Brazil-
ian depression after 2014 is the only episode of two years of consecutive fall in GDP,
interrupting a twenty-quarters, 22.8 % accumulated growth period (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Brazilian Expansions
Period Duration Accumulated Annualized average
(in quarters) growth* quarterly growth
1983Q2-1987Q2 17 30.0% 6.4%
1989Q1-1989Q2 2 8.5% 17.7%
1992Q2-1995Q1 12 19.2% 6.0%
1995Q4-1997Q4 9 8.0% 3.5%
1999Q2-2001Q1 8 7.3 % 3.7%
2002Q1-2002Q4 4 5.3% 5.3%
2003Q3-2008Q3 21 30.5% 5.2%
2009Q2-2014Q1 20 23.0% 4.2%
*Through to peak; Source: CODACE; Author’s elaboration.
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What is behind the 2014 Brazilian depression? The episode may have its roots
in both long and short run choices. The data from Penn World Table 9.0 in Feen-
stra et al. (2015) may shed some light on the long term trajectory. Using growth
accounting, the authors estimated how total factor productivity (TFP) evolved in
Brazil from 1950 to 2014. In Figure 4.2 we can see two major periods of TFP growth:
from 1950 to 1962 and from 1965 to 19805.
Figure 4.2: Total Factor Productivity (2011=1)
Source: Penn World Table 9.0; Author’s elaboration.
TFP was the main driver of economic cycles from 1970 to 1974 and from 1980
to 1998, whereas capital accumulation was the key factor within 1974 and 1979.
Controlling for the differences between private and public investment in the 1970s
and relative price dynamics (between investment and consumption goods) from the
1980s, the neoclassical growth model is able to explain the Brazilian cycles (Bugarin
et al., 2010). However, the volatility in consumption, hours and productivity is not
explained by a Real Business Cycle model (Ellery Jr et al., 2002), opening room for
extensions of the basic framework.
What about the short-run forces that explain the fall after 2014? Is it the
consequence of global events or rather of domestic choices. With that in mind the
next section addresses the source of the depression.
5The first period was interrupted due the political conditions at the time. After killing himself,
the former President Getu´lio Vargas left a weak economy to a distrusted-by-the-army vice-president
to govern. It was a time of a Parliamentarian trial, followed by military coup and a dictatorship.
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4.3 The source of the depression
The Brazilian depression emerged within a period where global GDP growth re-
mained relatively constant. Advanced economy marginally increased its performance
from 2014 to 2016, whereas Emerging Market Economies registered different records
according to the region. Table 4.3 presents IMF data from its World Economic Out-
look report released in April.
Table 4.3: World GDP Growth (%)
Country Group 2014 2015 2016
World 3.5 3.4 3.1
Advanced economies 2.0 2.1 1.7
Emerging and developing Asia 6.8 6.7 6.4
Emerging and developing Europe 3.9 4.7 3.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.2 0.1 -1.0
Argentina -2.5 2.6 -2.3
Chile 2.0 2.3 1.6
Colombia 4.4 3.1 2.0
Venezuela -3.9 -6.2 -18.0*
Brazil 0.5 -3.5 -3.5
Notes: Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,
April 2017.
While Emerging Asia had a small decrease in growth rates, Latin America and
the Caribbean countries felt from 1.2% to Latin America to minus 1%. This could
raise doubts regarding whether the roots of the depression are domestic or Inter-
national (regional, at least). Within Latin America, we have Chile and Colombia
that, even though with decreasing growth rates, they still grew and had a better
performance than its neighbors, Argentina and Venezuela. Figure 4.3 shows the
growth-inflation average performance for selected Latin America countries, where
sphere sizes are due to PPP adjusted per capita GDP.
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Figure 4.3: Growth and inflation after the 2008 crisis
Notes: Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,
April 2016; authors elaboration. Real GDP average growth from 2010 to 2016,
average CPI inflation from 2010 to 2016. Spheres size is given by PPP adjusted per
capita GDP.
If it was a global force what is holding Latin America back, one could expect all
countries falling in the left side and, if the Phillips curve holds, in the same quadrant
(or as close as it is possible). However, they have a very distinct track records,
perhaps a consequence of domestic choices, calling for a more rigorous approach.
4.3.1 A synthetic Brazil
The synthetic control method may help answer the following question: is the de-
pression a result of a domestic or an international dynamics? One might wonder
whether there may be a combination of economic policies (domestic source) causing
the depression. If this is the case, a “treatment-control group” approach could be
used to investigate the issue. The difficulty is that we cannot use a proper “control”
group, since there are no “two Brazils” to work with. One approach could be to
select a group of countries and use them as the control group. But which countries?
Are their weight in the group the same? Instead of choosing arbitrarily the “control”
group, a data-driven procedure is applied following Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie
et al. (2015).
Let us work with j = 1, ..., J + 1 units (countries), where j = 1 is the country we
are studying (i.e., Brazil) and the other j = 2 to j = J + 1 are the “candidates” for
comparison. In a balanced panel, data for Latin America and Caribbean countries
are gathered at t periods. Define T0 as the pre-intervention period and T1 as the
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post-intervention periods, with T = T0 + T1. The pre-intervention period is defined
from 2000 to 2010, whereas the post-intervention period is from 2011 to 2015, since
in 2011 there was an economic policy regime change with the new government.
A “synthetic Brazil” is built by averaging countries within the sample, with
the vector W = (w2, ..., wJ+1)
′, with 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 representing the weight of each
country6. Define Y1 as the (k×1) vector with the pre-intervention values for Brazilian
characteristics (in this case: inflation, GDP growth from 2000 to 2010, government
net borrowing and current account balance) and let Y0 be the (k × j) matrix of
pre-intervention values for the characteristics of the other countries in the sample.
The contribution of each country (the vector W ) is obtained by minimizing the
difference between observed Brazilian annual GDP growth in the pre-intervention
period (2000 to 2010) and the synthetic Brazilian annual GDP growth:
min
W
k∑
m=1
vm(Y1m − Y0m)2
where vm is the relative importance of the m − th variable, which is choosen as
a cross-validation method following Abadie et al. (2015). Using IMF’s data, the
synthetic Brazil is composed by the weighted average of Belize (0.089), Ecuador
(0.091), Guyana (0.178) Mexico (0.254), Peru (0.355) and Venezuela (0.033). Figure
4.4 Presents the pre/post 2011 behavior of observed GDP growth for actual and
synthetic Brazil.
Figure 4.4: Brazilian GDP growth: actual and synthetic
Note: Data from IMF.
The black line represents the actual Brazilian GDP annual growth. The gray
line is the synthetic Brazil (the “control group”). The upper and lower bounds
6See Table 5.2 for the list of the 32 countries and appendix C for data details.
73
(point estimations +/- 1.96 standard deviation) for the synthetic estimation are the
dashed lines. Not only the “treated” series has followed the lower bound, but also
it overpasses it.
The results corroborate with the hypothesis that a deceleration would happen,
but not as strong and recessive as the observed figures. It seems a domestic issue
after all. The next section aims to understand the drivers of the depression.
4.4 The transmission of the depression
The 2014-2016 Brazilian depression is one of the two longest episodes since 1981 and
is the deepest with respect to GDP fall (closely followed by the 1981Q-1983Q rece-
sion). This sections addresses the issue of what has been driving output since 2011.
The investigation of the dynamics of the depression imposes some challenges, since
there are several possible mechanisms available to explain the episode. Therefore,
the BCA method may help us to understand the depression.
This work complements BCA analysis of Chakraborty & Otsu (2013), Graminho
(2006) and Lama (2011) by not only extending the sample period, but also using
i) quartely data and ii) adjusting consumption and investment data by removing
durables goods from the former and adding it to the latter. Next we present the
neoclassical growth and the BCA results.
4.4.1 Accounting for business cycles in Brazil
The BCA exercises used data from the first quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of
20167. Figure 4.5 presents per worker output, investment, government consumption
plus net exports and hours of work for the depression period. There seems to be two
different moments: in the first (2014-2015), the behavior of macroeconomic variables
are similar. Output falls as well as hours of work, investment and government con-
sumption plus net exports. This seems to corroborate with the synthetic estimation
in which for the aforesaid period there was a more generalized deceleration, i.e. do-
mestic and international drivers for the GDP fall in Brazil and other Latin America
countries (materialized in the prescribed GDP fall for the synthetic Brazil).
In the second moment (2015-2016), however, even though hours of work kept
declining at the same rhythm, the output trajectory became steeper, investment
more depressed and even the strong increase in government consumption plus net
exports was not enough to sustain aggregate production8.
7See Appendix C for more details.
8Net exports tend to be counter-cyclical and follow exchange rate depreciation, whereas in some
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Figure 4.5: Macroeconomic variables (2014Q1=100)
Source: See appendix for BCA data; Author’s elaboration
Using the prototype economy and the presented data, one could estimate the
deviations from optimal behavior used in the Business Cycle Accounting. Figure
4.6 presents all wedges. It is interesting that while investment felt strongly during
the depression, the investment wedge actually rose at the same time, along with the
government consumption wedge. On the other hand, both the efficiency and the
labor wedges felt during the episode.
After estimating the wedges, the trajectory of output is simulated. Figure 4.7
presents two sets of simulations. In the top graphs there are the “one wedge
economies”, in which economies are simulated by allowing one wedge to fluctuate,
while the others remain constant. In the bottom graphs there are the “one wedge
off economies”, in which economies are simulated by holding one wedge constant
and allowing the other to fluctuate.
As we can see the simulated output path with the efficiency wedge accounts for
almost the whole production dynamics during the 2014-2016 depression. The model
with only a labor wedge prescribes a delayed (and softer) recession and the model
with only an investment wedge, even though accounts for the initial fall, presents a
faster output recovery. Finally, output does not fall with the model with only the
cases fiscal policy may also be counter-cyclical. See Frankel et al. (2013) for a discussion of fiscal
policy in emerging markets.
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Figure 4.6: Estimated HP-filtered wedges for the Brazilian economy
Source: Author’s elaboration
government consumption wedge.
Regarding the “one wedge off” simulations, the performance after removing the
efficiency wedge is the worst among the four cases. The other three follow the
observed output fall, even though the accuracy changes among them. Both one
wedge and one wedge off simulations seem to corroborate the hypothesis of a TFP
depression. Formally, we can test it with some statistics. Table 4.4 presents four
of them: success ratio, linear correlation, root mean-square error (RMSE) and a φ
statistic following Brinca et al. (2016), defined as follows:
φyi =
1/
∑
t(yt − yi,t)2∑
j(1/
∑
t(yt − yi,t)2)
where i is the subscript for output prescribed by each model and j is the total of
models considered. The statistics lies between 0 and 1 and the closest the value is to
1, the better. Therefore, the value is the contribution of each wedge for explaining
output movements.
As we can see the efficiency wedge accounts for 72.1% of output movements and
its role increases to 98% since 2014. Moreover, even if previous business cycles might
have been driven by a secondary role of other wedges (each account for around 9%
of output movements), the Brazilian depression is driven solely by the efficiency
wedge.
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Figure 4.7: Simulated economies during the depression
4.4.2 The Brazilian Quantitative Easing
From the synthetic control results, data seems to indicate that any attempt to
model the Brazilian depressions should encompass mainly domestics features. The
business cycle accounting results favor the efficiency wedge as the main driver of the
depression.
One important feature of the last decade in Brazil is the growing participation
of earmarked credit in total credit. Figure 4.8 presents the share of earmarked over
total amount of credit.
Earmarked credit represented 36% of total credit in the end of the first quarter
of 2007. In the second quarter of 2016 the share achieved 50%. A great part of this
is issued by the BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econoˆmico e Social
in the Portuguese acronym)9. The public bank share in 2007 was 33.1% of total
credit, whereas its participation rose to 41.5% at the beginning of 2015, diminishing
marginally to 39.1% at the end of the sample.
Due to importance of BNDES credit in the Brazilian economy and the role of
the efficiency wedge in the Brazilian depression, a question emerges: what is the
relation between the efficiency wedge and BNDES outlays? A simple model will
help to build the expectations regarding what data might tell us.
9BNDES credit outlays are mostly with earmarked resources.
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Table 4.4: BCA decomposition statistics
Statistic Efficiency Labor Investment Government
One wedge economies - full sample
Success Ratio 0.790 0.457 0.420 0.185
Correlation 0.858 0.539 -0.406 -0.753
RMSE 0.028 0.078 0.078 0.079
φyi 0.721 0.094 0.094 0.092
One wedge off economies - full sample
Success Ratio 0.407 0.864 0.765 0.963
Correlation -0.230 0.661 0.836 0.992
RMSE 0.077 0.031 0.046 0.009
1− φyi 0.279 0.906 0.906 0.908
One wedge economies - 2014 depression
Success Ratio 0.727 0.818 0.455 0.000
Correlation 0.989 0.949 -0.589 -0.977
RMSE 0.008 0.131 0.074 0.115
φyi 0.980 0.004 0.012 0.005
One wedge off economies - 2014 depression
Success Ratio 0.545 0.909 0.727 1.000
Correlation -0.089 0.983 0.979 1.000
RMSE 0.104 0.037 0.052 0.010
1− φyi 0.020 0.996 0.988 0.995
Success ratio: relative frequency when simulated and observed data had the same
sign; Linear correlations between simulated and observed data; RMSE: root of the
mean-square error; φ statistic following Brinca et al. (2016).
A simple model
Let us work within a two-period, perfectly competitive framework. The economy
has two sectors: a totally privately-funded, sector A, and a totally publicly-funded,
sector B. In the first period, agents choose the optimal allocation of resources
given their expectations for the efficiency shocks that will manifest themselves in
the second period. Final goods output (Yt) is obtained by combining production of
each sector (yi,t, i ∈ {A,B}) as follows:
Yt = (yA,t)
µ(yB,t)
1−µ
Each sector combines capital per unit of effective labor (ki,t, i ∈ {A,B}) accord-
ing to the following production technologies
yA,t = AA,tk
α
A,t
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Figure 4.8: Earmarked credit share share
Source: Brazilian Central Bank; Author’s elaboration
yB,t = AB,tk
θα
B,t
where α stands for the capital per unit of effective labor share in the procution of
each sector. For sector B, this share is multiplied by θ, allowing a different marginal
productivity of capital. All markets are perfectly competitive. Firms in sector A
maximize profits (ΠA,t) and finance capital accumulation with private funds:
max
kA,t
ΠA,t = yA,t − rtkA,t
Firms in sector A maximize profits (ΠA,t) and finance capital accumulation with
public funds:
max
kB,t
ΠB,t = yB,t − rtkB,t
In perfectly competitive markets the marginal product of capital must be equal
in both sectors. Using this result we may rewrite aggregate output as follows
Yt = AK
α
B,t
where
A = A
µ− µ
α−1
A A
µ
α−1+1−µ
B KB,t
is the efficiency wedge. This provides the intuition for the relationship between the
efficiency wedge and BNDES outlays. In the first period, just by accumulating more
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capital in sector B, aggregate total factor productivity (the efficiency wedge) would
rise. But would the wedge also rise in the second period? It depends. After making
all the decisions in the first period, at t = 2 there is a shock on the productivity of
each sector. If the shock is positive, the efficiency wedge keeps rising, whereas if the
shock is negative, the efficiency wedge decreases. Therefore we have two possible
scenarios: good news and bad news.
Good News Scenario
One hypothesis is that the public bank targeted projects with high social returns.
If this is the case, let us assume that after the increase in efficiency wedge in the
first period, positive spillovers would manifest in the second period, increasing pro-
ductivity in both sectors, augmenting the efficiency wedge even more. Figure 4.9
provides a representation of the dynamics of the efficiency wedge throughout time
under the good news scenario.
Figure 4.9: Efficiency wedge with positive social returns
Author’s elaboration
This would allow the economy to grow faster than dictated by factor accumula-
tion.
Bad News Scenario
What if public sector investments were made poorly? For instance, the subsidized
interest rate in public lending might induce an adverse selection problem through
the selection of low-return projects – that would not occur in the first place if the
interest rate was higher. If this was the case, in the second period, a negative
shock on the productivity of sector B would produce negative spillovers on sector
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A. Therefore, the efficiency wedge would fall at t = 2, as is represented in Figure
4.10.
Figure 4.10: Efficiency wedge with negative social returns
Source: Author’s elaboration
What does the data tell us?
VAR analysis
In order to answer the question of which scenario describes better what happened in
Brazil, a unrestricted VAR was estimated with the efficiency wedge from the BCA
(Act) and the log of BNDES outlays (B
c
t ; HP filtered and seasonally adjusted). Both
original series were multiplied by a 1999-crisis dummy (δ1999), which assumes a value
equals to two between the first quarter of 1996 and the last quarter of 2001, and a
value equals to one from the first quarter of 2002 to the second quarter of 2016.[
Act · δ1999
Bct · δ1999
]
= β0 + β1 ·
[
Act−1 · δ1999
Bct−1 · δ1999
]
+ β2 ·
[
Act−2 · δ1999
Bct−2 · δ1999
]
+
[
At
Bt
]
where β0 is the vector of constants, β1 and β2 are matrices of coefficients and 
A
t
and Bt stand for the errors. The Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria
favor the model with two lags. Figure 4.11 presents the ten-period accumulated
response of the efficiency wedge to a one standard deviation shock on BNDES outlays
using the Cholesky decomposition (results are robust to changes in variables order)
with 95% confidence intervals (doted lines).
As can be seem, the point estimation for the response of the efficiency wedge
initially rises, but the accumulated effect is negative (and statistically significant)
from the sixth quarter onwards. This corroborates with the idea of a “bad news
case” as described before. By choosing projects with low efficiency, the long run
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Figure 4.11: Response of the efficiency wedge to BNDES outlays
effects may be negative. During the sample period, this long run effects may have
been offset by new outlays, whereas de depression may also be a combination of
too much credit and a fall in this “Brazilian Quantitative Easing”, in a sort of
balance-sheet recession for both public and private agents.
The results are in line with the evidence that government-driven credit expansion
in Brazil, since they have been destined to larger and older firms, may have served as
counter-cyclical measure, but its continuity may have distorted resources allocation
(Bonomo et al., 2015). Moreover, the subsidies seem to have no impact on market
valuation and investment, only on the cost of funding, at least for publicly-traded
companies (Lazzarini et al., 2015).
4.4.3 Detailed economy
The importance of the public bank in the credit market justifies a model that not
only i) has a domestic trigger for the depression, ii) has an efficiency wedge as the
main driver of economic fluctuations, but also encompasses the role of the BNDES
in the Brazilian economy. With all that in mind, the model from Gertler & Karadi
(2011) is adapted to analyze to depressions. The model was originally used to
evaluate quantitative easing policies (QE). In some sense, the BNDES is responsible
for a sort of Brazilian QE.
Households
A continuum of identical households save, consume and supply labor. A fraction f
of the households members is composed by bankers. The probability of staying as a
banker in the next period is given by θ. Households solve the following maximization
problem:
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max
Ct,Lt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt[ln(Ct − hCt−1)− χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt ], (4.1)
subject to a budget constraint given by
Ct = WtLt + Πt − Tt +RtBt −Bt+1 (4.2)
where Ct is consumption, Lt stands for labor, Bt+1 and Rt are the short term debt
and its gross real return; Πt is the transfer from households to those entering in the
banking business and Tt are lump-sum taxes. The first order conditions are:
(Ct − hCt−1)−1 − βh(Ct+1 − hCt)−1 = λt, (4.3)
λtWt = χL
ϕ
t , (4.4)
βEtRt+1
λt+1
λt
= 1. (4.5)
Financial intermediaries
The financial firm j obtains funds from households’ savings in bonds and its stock
of wealth, Nj,t. Given the relative price (Qt) on financial claims, the total lend
to non-financial companies (Sj,t) evolves according to the following balance sheet
dynamics:
QtSj,t = Nj,t +Bj,t+1. (4.6)
The evolution of banker’s capital is given by:
Nj,t+1 = Rk,t+1QtSj,t −Rt+1Bj,t+1. (4.7)
Replacing the balance sheet dynamics into the previous equations yields:
Nj,t+1 = QtSj,t(Rk,t+1 −Rt+1) +Rt+1Nj,t. (4.8)
Let Λt,t+1 = λt+1/λt and define β
tΛt,t+1 as the stochastic discount factor for each
banker. The risk-adjusted premium is thus Etβ
tΛt,t+1(Rk,t+1−Rt+1) ≥ 0,∀t. Finan-
cial intermediates maximize expected wealth (Vj,t) and to to avoid an indefinitely
expansion of assets (moral hazard problem), funds will flow to the banker if
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Vj,t ≥ ΩQtSj,t, (4.9)
where Ω is the fraction of funds the banker diverts instead of transferring them back
to households. Therefore, the expected wealth is equal to:
Vj,t = vtQtSj,t + ηtNj,t, (4.10)
with
vt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(Rk,t+1 −Rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1vt+1], (4.11)
ηt = Et[(1− θ) + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1ηt+1], (4.12)
xt,t+1 =
Qt+1Sj,t+1
QtSj,t
, (4.13)
zt,t+1 =
Nj,t+1
Nj,t
, (4.14)
where vt is the expected discounted marginal gain of expanding assets and ηt is
the expected discounted gain of marginal wealth given the amount of assets. The
incentive constraint is thus
QtSj,t =
ηt
Ω− vtNj,t = φtNj,t, (4.15)
where φt is the leverage ratio. Assume it is the the same for each firm and we have:
QtSt = φtNt. (4.16)
Banker’s net wealth evolves according the following dynamics:
Nj,t+1 = (φt(Rk,t+1 −Rt+1) +Rt+1)Nj,t. (4.17)
Total net wealth (Nt) is a combination of the net wealth of existing bankers
(Ne,t)
Ne,t = θ[(Rk,t −Rt)φt−1 +Rt]Nt−1, (4.18)
and the net wealth of new bankers (Nn,t), financed with “start up” money from
households. The resources are a fraction (ω) of end-of-period assets of existing
bankers:
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Nn,t = ωQtSt−1. (4.19)
The law of motion of Nt may be rewritten as follows:
Nt = θ[(Rk,t −Rt)φt−1 +Rt]Nt−1 + ωQtSt−1. (4.20)
Credit Policy
The government issues debt to households to fund its credit policy. The cost of
debt is the riskless interest rate and it lends to non-financial firms at market lending
rates. However, government intermediation occurs inefficiently, bearing costs (τ)
per unit of government loan (QtSg,t). Public debt (Bg,t) will fund a fraction (ψt) of
fund, i.e.:
QtSg,t = ψtQtSt, (4.21)
Bg,t = ψtQtSt, (4.22)
Therefore, total amount of credit is the sum of private loans (Sp,t) and public
loans:
QtSt = QtSp,t +QtSg,t, (4.23)
where φc,t = 1/(1− ψt).
Intermediate goods firms
Value of capital acquired should be equal to the value of the claims to acquire capital:
QtKt+1 = QtSt. (4.24)
Firms produce intermediate goods (Yt) according to the following technology:
Yt = At(KtξtUt)
αL1−αt , (4.25)
where At is, Kt is the stock of capital, Ut stands for the utilization of capital and
ξt is the shock in the value of capital, which is assumed to follow an AR process.
Producers maximize profits taking the price of intermediate goods as given and
accounting for the costs of replacing capital (δ(Ut) = U
1+ζ
t /(1 + ζ)). The first order
conditions are
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α
Pm,tYt
Ut
= U ζtKtξt, (4.26)
(1− α)Pm,tYt
Lt
= Wt. (4.27)
Zero profits condition imply
Rk,t =
αPm,t+1Yt+1
Kt+1ξt+1
+Qt+1 − δ(Ut)
Qt
ξt+1. (4.28)
Capital producing firms
Capital producing firms also maximize profits by choosing net investment (In,t)
subject to adjustment costs (f(In,t, In,t−1)). Optimal choice is given by
Qt = 1 + ηi(In,t, In,t−1)− EtβΛt,t+1ηi(In,t+1, In,t). (4.29)
Final goods producers
From a cost minimization problem each the demand for each input (Yf,t) is given by
Yf,t = (
Pf,t
Pt
)−Yt, (4.30)
which depends of each input’s price (Pf,t), relative to total price index (Pt), given
the parameter for preferences, . Define the price index as follows:
Pt = [
∫ 1
0
P 1−f,t df ]
1
1− . (4.31)
Final goods producers set prices in a la Calvo, maximizing expected profits and
only a fraction resets prices. Under this set up, inflation (pi) is given by
Therefore
pi∗t =

− 1
Ft
Zt
pit, (4.32)
where pi∗t =
P∗t
Pt−1
and
Ft = YtPm,t + EtγβΛt,t+1(
pit+1
pi
γp
t
)Ft+1, (4.33)
Zt = Yt + EtγβΛt,t+1(
pit+1
pi
γp
t
)−1Zt+1. (4.34)
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Government and Central Bank
Differently from Gertler & Karadi (2011), government spending (Gt) is not constant.
It is assumed evolve according to the following dynamics:
Gt = Gt−1 + Gt , (4.35)
where Gt represents a fiscal policy shock and it is assumed to follow an AR(1)
process. The economy’s resource constraint thus becomes:
Yt = Ct + It +
ηi
2
(
In,t + Iss
In,t−1 + Iss
− 1)2(In,t + Iss) +G+ τψtQtKt+1. (4.36)
The government expenditure is financed via lump-sum taxes and government
financial intermediation
G+ τψtQtKt+1 = Tt + (Rk,t −Rt)Bg,t−1. (4.37)
Monetary policy decisions are emulated by a Taylor rule (in this paper, a modified
version than the one used in Gertler & Karadi (2011))10:
it = (1− ρ)(rNt + κpiEtpit+1 + κy(lnYt − lnY )) + ρit−1 + it, (4.38)
where lnYt − lnY is the output gap and rNt is the natural real interest rate that
would prevail within a flexible prices context (equals to the marginal product of
capital). The real interest rate is obtained by the Fisher equation:
1 + it = Rt+1Et
Pt+1
Pt
. (4.39)
Finally, the dynamics of the public development, BNDES. The idea is that the
bank injects resources on the economy considering its sensitivity to credit spreads
and an exogenous shock (ψt ), which can encompass other determinants of the loans
that are not technical, such as political will.
ψt = ψ + νEt[(logRk,t+1 − logRt+1)− (logRk − logRt)] + ψt . (4.40)
After describing the model, the next section presents the output dynamics pre-
scribed by the model, as well as the observed data.
10Gertler & Karadi (2011) use minus the price markup as a proxy for the output gap; moreover,
they assume a slightly differente functional form.
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Calibration and simulation
The model was calibrated following mainly Gertler & Karadi (2011), with a few
exceptions for adjusting it to the Brazilian reality. For instance, the authors set
the leverage ratio in the steady state equals to 4, whereas in this paper it set to
1.5, more suitable to a greater debt intolerance within emerging markets. Table 4.5
presents the other parameters:
Table 4.5: Parameters
Parameter Value Source
Households
Discount factor β 0.99 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Habit parameter h 0.815 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Relative utility weight of labor χ 3.409 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ 0.276 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Financial Intermediaries
Fraction of capital that can be diverted Ω 0.381 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Proportional transfer to the entering bankers ω 0.002 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Survival rate of the bankers θ 0.972 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Intermediate good firms
Capital share α 0.4 Ferreira et al. (2008)
Steady state depreciation rate δ(U) 0.05 Ferreira et al. (2008)
Elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to utilization rate ζ 7.200 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
AR coefficient of ξ ρξ 0.9 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Capital Producing Firms
Inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital ηi 1.728 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Final goods producers
Elasticity of substitution  4.167 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Probability of keeping prices fixed γ 0.779 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Price indexation γp 0.241 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Public sector
Inflation coefficient of the Taylor rule κpi 1.5 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Output gap coefficient of the Taylor rule κy 0.50/4 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule ρ 0.8 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
Steady state proportion of government expenditures G
Y
0.2 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
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By assigning to the model the aforesaid parameters, one is able to see what
would be the prescribed path of output during the Brazilian depression. Figure
4.12 presents the outcome of the log-linearized version of the model with HP-filter
(Hodrick & Prescott, 1997) observed output data.
Figure 4.12: Output: data vs model
Notes: The outcome of a log-linearized model and the HP-filtered output data.
As can be seen, the model is able to account for the fall in output. Moreover, it
also produces a brief marginal increase in 2016, followed by another marginal fall.
This corroborates with the idea that the credit market is important to understand
the transmission of the depression.
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4.5 Final remarks
Brazil has been facing a real challenge in order to restore growth rates once ex-
perience until the mid-1970s. Even though it usually recovers from short-run falls
relatively fast, the low productivity makes it difficult for the country to experience
a better long-run performance.
The year of 2010 registered a high 7.5% growth rate, but since then the country
seems to have lost its ability to grow. What is the reason? The econometric evidence
in Section 4.3 points towards a domestic issue. If this is the case, what decisions
have been made and are driving output during the 2014 depression? The BCA in
Section 4.4 helps us to answer this question and reveals a great (almost exclusive)
role for the efficiency wedge. The next step is to find a model that accounts for the
dynamics of output with this sort of distortion.
Data from the Brazilian Central Bank shows that earmarked credit share on total
credit rose systematically since 2007. Moreover, the Brazilian National Development
Bank (BNDES) is the main player. The economy seems to have gotten used to rely
on subsidized credit to grow. Furthermore, the econometric evidence of this paper
indicates that the medium/long run consequences of BNDES’s outlays are negative.
To overlap possible negative effects, more loans were made, but the situation was
unsustainable and eventually the net outlays were negative.
A DSGE model encompassing the role of the public bank was able to account
for output dynamics and the dependence of the economy on BNDES, as well as the
indebteness of other agents and the importance of the credit market in the Brazilian
Depression.
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Chapter 5
Final remarks
The opening question of this doctoral thesis is: what drives recessions and ex-
pansions? Even within the scope of a PhD program, in that general formulation,
answering that question is a lifetime research agenda (with probably no exhaustive
answers). Nevertheless, the work presented in the previous chapters moved knowl-
edge regarding business cycles analysis a few steps forward. This section summarizes
the main finds of this thesis and presents reflections on future research.
5.1 Summary of results
Modeling business cycles is a hard task, but the advent of Business Cycle Accounting
brought an important tool for dealing with model selection. As can be seen in
Chapter 2, the use of the method has grown throughout time. In the chapter, the
comprehensive survey on BCA literature (and its extensions) revealed that, usually,
hours of work are closely related to the labor wedge, as well as output to the efficiency
wedge and the investment wedges to both aggregate investment and country risk
spreads in an open-economy framework. The government consumption wedge very
often does not play an important part in explaining macroeconomic variables, even
though for a few papers, it has a secondary/tertiary role.
Besides the macroeconomic variables/wedges relations, the chapter also presents
important broad conclusions. Whenever modeling contagion episodes or dealing
with economic policy in emerging markets, the relative importance of the efficiency
wedge decreases (even though is frequently the main driver of short run output
fluctuation) and therefore the other wedges become more important. Major events
such as the Great Depression and the 2008 financial crisis also present that feature.
Chapter 2 also provides three BCA exercises for US data. Focusing on the
1973, 1990 and 2001 recessions, this thesis fulfill a “gap” on BCA literature that
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does not account for analyzing the drivers of these specific episodes. In the first
two recessions (1973 and 1990), despite the protagonism of the efficiency wedge,
the labor wedge plays a secondary role. Both wedges explain 85-90% of output
movements. On the latter recession, however, the secondary role is played by the
government consumption wedge, an uncommon finding.
Another important result presented in Chapter 2 is related to the drivers of
recessions and expansions in general. Do they change? That means, does the
relative importance of each wedge change depending on the phase of the business
cycle? The answer is yes. Expansions are usually driven by the efficiency wedge,
but with a secondary role of the labor wedge, whereas recessions are mainly driven
by the efficiency wedge (84% of output movements are explained by the efficiency
wedge alone in recessions, while the same 84% are obtained with both the efficiency
and the labor wedge in expansions).
The other dimension of BCA is the equivalence theorems, i.e., mappings between
detailed DSGEs and the prototype economy with wedges. Chapter 3 presents a con-
tribution in that dimension. By dealing with the fact that integration of goods mar-
ket may change not only how output is produced, but also how international crises
are transmitted, it proposes equivalences between the neoclassical growth model (for
both the closed and open-economy formulations) and a small open-economy model
augmented with intermediate imported goods in the production function.
Using the different recoveries Mexico experienced during “Tequila crisis” and
the Great Recession, BCA was applied and the main driver of both episodes is the
efficiency wedge. From the aforesaid equivalence results, the small open-economy
model was able to explain both the rapid recovery from the 1995 episode as well as
the slow recovery after the 2008 financial crisis.
Chapter 4 analyses the 2014-2016 economic depression in Brazil. Its contribu-
tions rely on the source of the depressions and the transmission of it. In the former,
since the deceleration/contraction in Brazilian GDP was stronger than its peers and
the expected path of its synthetic version, econometric estimations point towards a
domestic-born episode, rejecting the hypothesis that the episode was a fault of the
international environment.
Business Cycle Accounting was used and the driver of the Brazilian depression is
the efficiency wedge. Due to the recent “quantitative easing” via the federal public
development bank (BNDES in the Portuguese acronym), i.e., a strong expansion of
loans via BNDES, the hypothesis that the relationship between efficiency wedge and
BNDES’s outlays was investigated. Econometric results find that after an increase
in BNDES’s outlays there is a small positive increase in the efficiency wedge in the
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first quarters, followed by a larger fall afterwards, offsetting the initial movements.
The hypothesis that the economic depression could be explained by a model
that incorporates the credit market was tested by confronting the output prescribed
by a DSGE model with financial frictions (adapted to Brazil) with observed data.
According to econometric and modeling exercises, the depression is a result of both
negative lagged effects of public credit expansion, short-run credit cuts and the
dynamics of the rest of the credit market.
The results presented in this section are the pillars for guidelines on future re-
search discussed in the next section.
5.2 Reflections for future research
From Chapter 2 we saw that recessions and expansions have different drivers. Would
this result change according to economic policy? For instance, in the spirit of Brinca
(2014), a “cross-section BCA” could explain whether the drivers of short run move-
ments change if there is a specific orientation for economic policy such as the so-called
macroeconomic populism (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1990). Using a sample of coun-
tries that experienced that sort of orientation, one could compare “populist years”
with the period without populism regarding the dynamics, the distribution and the
relative importance of wedges.
From Chapter 3 we learned that an international crisis may manifest itself via
other wedges rather than as a balance-of-payments/government consumption driven
issue. There may be other cases. For instance, Brinca et al. (2016) find that for
Spain, Ireland, and Iceland, the main driver was the investment wedge. Was this
result another case of balance-of-payments-variables influencing other distortions?
For instance, the search may follow the link between international portfolios and
business cycles in those countries.
From Chapter 4 we analyzed the real side of the economic depression in Brazil.
What about the dynamics of inflation? Two paths may emerge. On one hand, in
order to understand the drivers of inflation, a monetary business cycle accounting
decomposition could be done. On the other hand, instead of departing from tradi-
tional business cycle accounting, one could rely on different mappings (see Chapter
2 for list of mappings) to focus exclusively on the drivers of inflation.
93
Appendices
Appendix A – Chapter 2
Data for the business cycle accounting exercises in Chapter 2 comes mainly from
OECD (Economic Outlook No 98 - November 2015), from 1960Q1 to 2014Q4. Below
there are the variable descriptions, units (if it is an index the base in parenthesis)
and codes in brackets. Output and its components are deflated in BCA.
• Gross domestic product, value, market prices; US Dollar [GDP]
• Gross domestic product, deflator, market prices; index (2009) [PGDP]
• Gross fixed capital formation, total, value. US Dollar [ITISK]
• Gross capital formation, deflator; index (2009) [PITISK]
• Private final consumption expenditure, value, GDP expenditure approach; US
Dollar [CP]
• Private final consumption expenditure, deflator; index (2009) [PCP]
• Government final consumption expenditure, value, GDP expenditure approach;
US Dollar [CG]
• Government final consumption expenditure, deflator; index (2009) [PGP]
• Imports of goods and services, value, National Accounts basis; US Dollar
[MGSD]
• Imports of goods and services,deflator, National Accounts basis; index (2009)
[PMGSD]
• Exports of goods and services, value, National Accounts basis; US Dollar
[XGS]
• Exports of goods and services, deflator, National Accounts basis; index (2009)
[PXGS]
• Hours worked per employee, total economy; Hours [HRS]
• Total employment, Labour force statistics definition; Persons [ET]
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Appendix B – Chapter 3
Parameterization
Table 5.1: Parameters for the model with SGU preference
Parameter Value Source
γ 2 Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003)
δ 0.1 Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003)
φ 0.028 Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003)
ω 1.455 Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003)
ψ 0.000742 Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003)
d 0.7442 Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003)
β 0.98 Kim (2014)
µ 0.98 Imports/GDP in Mexico as in Kim (2014)
ρe 0.73 Corsetti et al. (2008)
Investment wedge arising from different preferences
Considerer the prototype economy. A model with different preferences regarding
consumption and leisure than those in BCA exercises match equilibrium allocations
in the prototype economy with an investment wedge.
It is useful to rewrite equation 3.3 with BCA preferences:
1
ct(st)
(1 + τx,t(s
t)) = βEt[
1
ct+1(st+1)
(At+1(s
t+1)Fk,t + (1− δ)(1 + τx,t+1(st+1) + φkt+1 ].
Define (1 + τx,t(s
t)) = ct
(ct(st)−ω1lωt (st))−γ . Replacing this in the previous equations
yields
(ct(s
t)− ω−1lωt (st))−γ = βEt[(ct+1(st+1)− ω−1lωt+1(st))−γ(At+1(st+1)Fk,t + (1− δ) + φkt+1 ],
which is the same as equation 3.3 rewritten with SGU preferences.
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Appendix C – Chapter 4
Data description
• GDP: Gross domestic product in current values for the first quarter of 1996.
For the second quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source: IBGE.
• Consumption: Household consumption in current values for the first quarter
of 1996. For the second quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source:
IBGE
• Durables goods consumption: Household consumption multiplied by durables
goods consumption share. Author’s calculation.
• Durables goods consumption share: using Brazilian input-output matrices
from IBGE for years 2000 and 2005, the share was calculate following Ellery Jr
et al. (2002); from 2006 to 2015, only a random shock was considered (using
excel, a pseudo random number from a Normal distribution with mean equals
to zero and variance equals to the series variance - seed: 13).
• Investment: Investment in current values for the first quarter of 1996. For the
second quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source: IBGE.
• Exports: Exports in current values for the first quarter of 1996. For the second
quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source: IBGE.
• Imports: Exports in current values for the first quarter of 1996. For the second
quarter onwards real growth was applied. Source: IBGE.
• National accounts growth: Quarterly real growth. Source: OECD Statistics.
• Hours of Work: Average Annual Hours Worked by Persons Engaged for Brazil.
For 2015 the same value of 2014 was used. Source: Penn World Table.
• Population: Working age population (15-64). For 2013, 2014 and 2015, the val-
ues were estimated using the average growth between 2012 and 1992. Source:
OECD Statistics.
• Total earmarked credit: Data from the Brazilian Central Bank.
• Total non-earmarked credit: Data from the Brazilian Central Bank.
• BNDES outlays: Data from the Brazilian Central Bank.
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Synthetic control
Table 5.2: Full sample
Antigua and Barbuda Argentina The Bahamas Barbados
Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile
Colombia Costa Rica Dominica Dominican Republic
Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala
Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica
Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay
Peru St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela
Table 5.3: Country weights
Country Weight
Belize 0.089
Ecuador 0.091
Guyana 0.178
Mexico 0.254
Peru 0.355
Venezuela 0.033
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